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INTRODUCTION
Governmental actions with respect to the AIDS epidemic should serve
three goals: care of the sick, protection of the interests of the infected, and
minimization of the number of new infections. Because the likely
consequences of infection are so horrible and so hard to ameliorate,
minimizing new infections should rank as the most important of the three
goals.
Infection can be prevented by reducing the number of risky acts, by
reducing the riskiness of each individual act, or by lowering the proportion of
risky acts involving a combination of infected and uninfected individuals.
"Risk compensation"-the tendency of individuals to respond to risk-
reducing changes in the environment by behaving less cautiously-may
reduce, or even reverse, the value of policies directed at changing the
riskiness of specific acts or the infected/uninfected contact rate. Technical
and social innovations which allow potential sexual partners easily to
determine their relative status (that is, both infected or uninfected, or one of
each) could create substantial benefits for some populations. Thinking about
them provides an illuminating example of the complications of AIDS related
policies.
All approaches to the AIDS problem are complicated by its connection
with socially disapproved forms of pleasure seeking. Where policy touches
vice, two sets of strong responses are evoked. One response comes from
those who regard vice as inherently bad in ways not limited to its observable
results. The other comes from those who oppose state interference in such
matters on the principle of individual liberty. The two groups are alike in
being unwilling to judge policies solely by their likely foreseeable
consequences, and thus in their rejection of "policy analysis" as the right way
to resolve policy controversy. If AIDS policy remains caught in a crossfire
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between moralists and libertarians, there will be many preventable infections
and deaths.
II
THINKING ABOUT THE EPIDEMIC
A. Approaching AIDS as if only AIDS Mattered
The objectives of policy directly related to AIDS should be care of the ill,
protection of the interests of the infected, and prevention of new infections.
The ill need treatment, although little is yet available other than comfort and
palliation. All, or virtually all, of the AIDS patients will die, many of them in
extreme discomfort.' Social policy can make their lives easier with competent
and sensitive medical treatment and hospice care, psychological counseling
and support, and protection from others' irrational fears; social policy can
make their lives harder by denying employment, housing, or health care
protection to the infected.
The overwhelming interest of the infected is in not becoming ill.
Apparently, a variety of insults to the immune system can speed the process of
disease expression. 2 It is likely that drugs such as azidothymadine (AZT) can
retard that process. 3 The probability that an infected person will become ill
remains disputed, but long term cohort studies suggest rates of more than 50
percent.4 It is possible that many infected individuals whose immune systems
do not collapse will die from degeneration of their central nervous systems. 5
Infected persons also have more immediate interests in maintaining their
employment, their housing, their health insurance, their lifestyles, and their
anonymity. However, preventing new infections should take precedence
among policy objectives because the consequences of infection are so
unpleasant. Of two alternative courses of action, the one which is less
effective in reducing the transmission of AIDS ought to have very substantial
advantages on other criteria to receive serious consideration.
It is important to develop an overall view of the biomedical, technological,
social, and strategic aspects of any AIDS control policy before examining
specific policies as they apply to particular groups or situations. This essay
will first examine transmission and transmission prevention, interventions and
the way individuals can be expected to react to changes in risk, and the
technical ramifications and political implications of testing and identification
devices. Then, it will apply these general concepts to specific populations and
problems.
1. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE & NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS:
DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH 47 (1986) [hereinafter N.A.S.].
2. Id. at 45, 56 (for example, infection with pathogens, exposure to foreign proteins,
pregnancy).
3. Id. at 215.
4. Id. at 7; see also German Survey's Gloomy Outlook, 324 NATURE 199 (1986).
5. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 49 (The virus infects nerve cells as well as immune-system cells.).
[Vol. 51 : No. I
Page 315: Winter 1988] AIDS, VICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
B. The Algebra of Transmission
The AIDS virus, HIV, can encode its genetic information into the nucleus
of T4 helper lymphocytes, a variety of what were once called "white blood
cells". 6 In addition to blood, the virus has been isolated from other body
fluids, including semen. 7 The virus can be transmitted when any body fluid
from an infected person enters the bloodstream of an uninfected person, or
makes contact with the T4 helper cells in the vagina. 8 The virus also can be
transmitted from mother to child in utero or by breast feeding. 9 Sexual
congress of various kinds, the sharing of hypodermic needles, and
transfusions of blood or blood components account for nearly all of the
known cases of transmission in the United States.' 0 Persons infected with
HIV are commonly referred to as "seropositive" and those not so infected as
"seronegative."'
The chances of becoming infected with HIV depend on what an individual
does, how often, and with whom.' 2 An individual's probability of becoming
infected within "n" acts of a particular type with partners chosen at random is
1-[I-(R * SpOS)]n,1 3 where "R" equals the risk of acquiring the virus
6. Id. at 43.
7. Id. at 51.
8. Id. at 190.
9. See Letter from LaPointe, Michaud, Pekovic, Chausseau & Dupuy to NEW ENG. J. MED.,
reprinted in 312 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1325, 1325 (1985) (case study suggests transplacental transmission
of HTLV-III virus); Zeigler, Cooper, Johnson & Gold, Postnatal Transmission of AIDS-Associated
Retrovirus from Mother to Infant, 1985-1 LANCET 896, 896-97 (case study suggests transmission by
breast feeding).
10. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 50.
11. This paper follows this nomenclature although it is not entirely accurate.
12. This paper assumes, as most of the literature does, that forms of contact other than sex,
needle sharing, and transfusion (often referred to as "casual contact," and including situations where
blood or other fluids enter through minor breaks in the skin, as when an infected individual bleeds
on an uninfected individual who has a cut, or through insect bites) pose only negligible risks, at least
under U.S. conditions. See, e.g., Mueller, The Epidemiology of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 14 LAw,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 250, 256 (1986); Leishman, AIDS and Insects, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept.
1987, at 56. If this were incorrect, far more intrusive policies would be required to control the
epidemic. Screening of blood donors and of donated blood has reduced the transmission related
risk to near zero. See N.A.S., supra note I, at 61.
13. The formula is derived as follows:
The chance of being infected on any one occasion is the specific risk (R) times the chance that
one's partner is infected (SPOS). Thus, if there were a 50% chance that one's partner were infected
and a 2% chance that a given act will lead to transmission, then the probabilities of becoming
infected after the first act would be 0.5 X 0.02 = 0.01. Thus, the chance of remaining uninfected
after one act is I - (R X SPOS); in this example, 0.99. This is the chance of "success" at remaining
uninfected in one trial. Remaining uninfected on "n" such occasions (drawing a new partner each
time) requires "n" consecutive successes, and, assuming that the chance on each trial is independent
of previous results, the multiplication rule provides the basis for computing the chance of remaining
uninfected after n trials. For example, the chance of remaining uninfected after two trials would be
0.99 X 0.99 (i.e., 0.99') or .9801; of remaining uninfected after three trials 0.99 X 0.99 X 0.99 (i.e.,
0.993) or 0.9703, and the chance of remaining infected after "n" trials 0.99". The chance of being
infected is I minus the chance of remaining uninfected; if 1% are infected, 99% are not. Thus, the
chance of remaining uninfected in "n" trials is 1- [ I - (R * SPOS)]". Since few if any persons either
choose partners at random or engage in exactly the same behavior repeatedly, a precise determination
of risk would require a more elaborate calculation, but the formula as given seems adequate for
exposition.
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through a single act of a given type with an infected partner (sometimes called
"specific risk"), "SPOS" equals the seroprevalence rate in the population
from which partners are drawn, and "n" equals the number of acts. This
formula ignores the possibility that per-act risk will increase over time due to
a series of exposures to the virus. In such "multiple-hit" models, risks rise
more rapidly with "n" than the formula suggests. Applying the formula to
estimating what proportion of an at-risk population will be infected assumes
further that individuals are homogeneous with respect to their propensities
for infection. If that were untrue-in particular, if some persons had natural
immunity-the cumulative probability of infection over the population might
rise toward some value less than unity.
An individual can improve the safety of his or her conduct by controlling
the frequency of his or her risky acts, the riskiness of each act, or the
prevalence of the virus among his or her partners. As any one of these three
variables approaches zero, so does the individual's probability of becoming infected. The
relationships are far from linear. An increase in the number of partners,
independent of the number of different acts, increases the risk of infection in
two ways. First, it raises the probability of having one or more seropositive
partners over a long series of contacts. If partners are randomly selected
from a population with a seroprevalence rate "SPOS" over a long series of
risky acts, an individual's probability of infection approaches unity (certainty)
as the number of acts rises without limit. However, if a single partner is
chosen from the same population, the probability of infection rises more
slowly and approaches, not unity, but the rate of the infection in the general
population. The probability of infection after "n" acts of risk "R" with a
single partner with a "SPOS" chance of being infected would be [l - [1 - (R
* SPOS)]"]. Second, if fidelity tends to be mutual, a single chosen partner's
probability of being infected rises more slowly in a world of rising prevalence
than does the probability of infection for partners chosen at random.
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Although an individual may care only about his or her own probability of
infection, public concern should focus on the total number of transmissions.
The number of transmissions depends upon the number of risky contacts, the
specific risks, and the proportion of contacts where one partner is infected
and the other is not. Thus, transmissions can be controlled by reducing
frequency, reducing specific risks, or reducing the probability that any given
contact involves both seropositive and seronegative individuals.
C. Probabilities of Retransmission Across Populations
The algebra of transmission becomes much more complicated when the
probability of retransmission is taken into account. Each newly infected
person has some probability of infecting one or more additional persons, a
probability that will vary from person to person. Some individuals, if infected,
will be particularly likely to transmit the virus to many partners, while others
will present much smaller retransmission risks. In planning interventions,
these differences matter; the more likely a person is to retransmit, the more
valuable it is to keep him or her from becoming infected in the first place.
Similarly, preventing the infection of someone on one occasion whose
behavior and setting make it highly probable that he or she will be infected
later on is less valuable than preventing the infection of someone who is
otherwise at very low risk. ' 4
The epidemic control effort faces a number of analytic tasks. Specifying
how retransmission and the probability of later infection, if infection is
prevented on one occasion, influence the relative value of different
interventions stands out among those analytice tasks, both in importance and
in conceptual and computational difficulty.
Since the behaviors implicated in becoming infected are largely identical
to those implicated in transmitting infection, determining which individuals
are most worth protecting from an epidemic-control viewpoint is
extraordinarily complex; the two factors-retransmission probability and
probability of becoming infected later if "saved" now-act in opposite
directions. A comprehensive model has yet to be developed. However, three
general remarks can be made.
First, high-transmission-activity individuals in subpopulations with low
current prevalence of the virus deserve special attention. If, for example,
there were an isolated group of intravenous drug users who shared needles
among themselves, and if none of them were currently infected, preventing
the first infection would be extraordinarily valuable. Second, as the
prevalence among a subpopulation rises, the number of secondary infections
prevented by preventing primary infections falls. For example, once half of
the hypothetical drug using group's members were infected, preventing one
member from being infected on one occasion would not greatly change either
14. Preventing such a transmission would still be valuable, because it would lengthen the period
after which the individual becomes infectious, in addition to lengthening his or her life expectancy.
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his lifetime chances of infection or the overall riskiness of sharing needles
among the group. Finally, transmission to individuals outside the established
"risk groups" deserves special attention. The partners of someone with no
obvious infection risk are less likely to protect themselves than those of
someone with such risks. Moreover, both the primary and secondary cases
are less likely to be infected later when the individuals are outside the
established "risk groups."
D. Risky Acts and Their Specific Risks
Blood transfusion has the highest specific risk; there is no documented
case where a recipient of whole blood from an infected donor did not become
infected. No technique is in sight to reduce the specific risk in whole blood
transfusion. ' 5
Injection with a hypodermic syringe previously used by another person is
risky, particularly if that person drew some blood into the syringe.16 Needle
sharing is unknown in medical practice in the United States, but is common
among those who inject illicit drugs.17 Under street conditions, any injection
must be regarded as risky, because used needles are sometimes repackaged
and sold as new.' 8 The specific risk of self-injection can be reduced by
sterilizing the needle and syringe. 19
The risk to the party penetrated (the "receptive" partner) varies in sexual
contact involving anal, vaginal, or oral penetration, apparently in that order. 20
The "insertive" partner is also at a substantial risk under Central African and
Haitian conditions where open lesions are common; this risk is much lower
under U.S. conditions. Lesions in the skin or mucous membranes, such as
those caused by sexually transmitted diseases ("STD's"), seem to increase an
individual's specific risk. 2' To the extent that such lesions promote infection,
preventing STD's helps control the specific risk of sexual contact. The use of
condoms reduces specific risk directly, by preventing interchange of body
fluids, and indirectly, by reducing STD transmission.
E. Strategic Interaction and Transmission Rates
From the perspective of reducing the total number of new HIV infections,
the seropositive and seronegative populations are symmetric; sexual contact
15. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 54 (Although transfusions of some blood factors can be made safe by
heating, heating destroys whole blood.).
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. (HIV may be transmitted through IV drug use). All such injections are referred to as
"intravenous" or "IV" drug use, though some subcutaneous injection occurs.
18. Friedman, DesJarlais & Sotheran, AIDS Health Education for Intravenous Drug Users, 13 HEALTH
EDUC. Q. 383, 387 (1986). The risk is reduced rather than eliminated due to the possibility of faulty
sterilization technique.
19. Cf id. at 386-87 (IV users have attempted to sterilize needles to avoid HIV transmissions).
20. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 51-52. The medical literature is remarkably free of any sort of
conjecture on specific risks of different acts; this would seem to be an important area of inquiry so far
unexplored.
21. Id.
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of needle sharing within either group poses no threat of infection, but contact
across group lines does pose such a threat. To avoid infecting others,
seropositives should avoid risky contact with seronegatives; to avoid
becoming infected, seronegatives should avoid contact with seropositives. If
there is a general moral duty to avoid harming others, seropositives have a
moral duty to avoid transmitting the infection. Because any infected person
risks infecting others, seronegatives have a moral duty to avoid becoming
infected.
To the extent that sex and needle sharing are accompanied by bonds of
affection and esteem which lead partners to be concerned about each other's
health, individuals will have private reasons to avoid spreading the virus. But
some individuals will be more concerned about protecting themselves than
they are about protecting their partners, particularly where contact is
anonymous, indifferent, or even hostile. In these cases, the symmetry
between the infected and the uninfected breaks down; the infected threaten
the health of the uninfected, but not vice versa.
Moreover, body fluid contact between seropositive persons, although
"safe" as far as new infection is concerned, might increase their risks of
progressing from infection to active disease. Because reexposure to HIV may
be a cofactor for disease expression, 22 a rational, but entirely selfish, infected
person would prefer an uninfected to an infected sexual partner. 23
Asymmetric risk creates an incentive to misrepresent one's own HIV status
once one is infected. Thus, even if there were no psychological or practical
barriers to learning one's HIV status, self-interest alone need not lead to
socially optimal behavior.
Even the incentives for the uninfected to avoid infection do not reflect the
common interest in their doing so. A rationally selfish, uninfected person
would choose, all other things equal, to have sexual relations or share needles
with another uninfected individual rather than an infected one. If caution,
whether in the form of screening potential partners, reducing sexual
frequency, or practicing safer sex, has costs in inconvenience, embarrassment,
or pleasure forgone, these costs must be weighed against the benefits of
reduced risk. Not all of the benefits accrue to the individual practicing caution
because not all of the costs are borne by the newly infected. In addition to
further burdening strained health care resources, each new infection presents
an increased chance of further infections.
The consequences of infection arguably create more than adequate
incentives for caution. But despite the catastrophic consequences of
infection, extremely low probability risks may be inadequate deterrents, even
if the decisionmaker is perfectly rational. The tendencies some persons have
22. Harris, The AIDS Epidemic Looking into the 1990's, TECHNOLOGY REV., Jul. 1987, at 58, 61
(computations from working backward from AIDS data to get the number of individuals infected with
HIV).
23. Although exposure to foreign proteins or pathogens may also be cofactors in disease
expression, the practice of safe sex and the sterilization of needles might still confer some health
benefit on the infected individual.
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taken to reduce one factor cause an increase in another?30 Third, what effects
will the knowledge that one risk factor has been reduced have on behavior?3'
Fourth, what side effects will the proposed intervention have on the health
and welfare of the infected and the care of the sick?3 2 Fifth, what side-effects
will the intervention have on situations other than the AIDS epidemic, either
directly or through changes in behavior that adjust to decreased risk?3 3
Finally, what effects will the intervention have on public morals and
liberties? 34
The possibly perverse results that risk reduction can create-results that
flow from individuals' knowledge of decreased risk and their use of that
knowledge-are discussed in the economics literature under the heading of
"risk compensation."-3 5 In general, everyone responds to the risks he or she
faces. Risk is a kind of cost; lower "prices" in the form of lower risks lead to
more "consumption."-3 6 Despite cognitive and psychological difficulties in
dealing with uncertainty,3 7 caution responds to risk. Generally, if risk
diminishes, caution does also. For example, if drivers perceive that passive
restraints reduce their risk of injury from collisions, they will drive faster.
Thus, imposed measures to reduce risk lead to compensating behavior which
tends to increase risk. 38
Increases in safety devices can even lead to increases in total incurred losses
by decreasing caution and increasing the frequency of risky activity.3 9 This
Needle exchange Isolation of seropositives
(variety of forms)
Conjugal visits for prisoners Licensing of prostitutes
(substitutes generally safer
heterosexual acts for less
safe anal intercourse)
(This table includes only interventions which could be expected to have some impact on HIV
transmission. Many other interventions have been suggested, including mass testing of teachers
and the refusal of parole to HIV-positive inmates, which do not seem to present any significant
benefits.)
30. Legalizing heroin, for example, might reduce specific risk while increasing frequency.
31. If potential heroin users are deterred by the threat of AIDS, making clean needles available
may increase frequency just because it reduces specific risk. The net effect on transmission of
changing two factors in opposite directions remains unclear until the magnitude of the changes is
specified.
32. Legalizing heroin might protect currently infected IV users from further exposure to HIV
and other pathogens, thus decreasing their rate of disease expression.
33. Even if legalizing heroin would decrease the overall number of transmissions via IV drug
use, what would be the effects on the health and welfare of the new crop of heroin users, and on their
performance as family members, neighbors, and citizens? Would existing heroin users benefit from
legalization in ways other than avoiding HIV infection, and would some of those benefits flow
through to others?
34. The legalization of heroin pits the moralists and the libertarians squarely against each other.
35. The author thanks Philip Cook for highlighting the importance of this topic.
36. See Orr, Incentives and Efficiency in Automobile Safety Regulation, Q. REV. EcoN. & Bus., Autumn
1982, at 43, 44-48; Cook, Criminal Incapacitation Effects Considered in an Adaptive Choice Framework, in THE
REASONING CRIMINAL 202, 207-08, 213 (D. Cornish & R. Clarke eds. 1986).
37. See generally Zeckhauser, supra note 24.
38. See generally Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83J. POL. ECON. 677 (1975).
39. If aircraft safety programs increase the demand for air travel, the number of people killed in
air crashes could increase even as the risks per flight or per mile fell.
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need not imply any irrationality on the part of persons taking risks, only that
they care about the rewards of the risky activity and the costs of caution as
well as the risks they face. Just as the total dollar value of sales may rise as the
price of a commodity falls, participation in risky activities may rise so much as
risks decrease that total injuries rise as well.
If individuals adjust their behavior to changes in risk, they will, if they are
correctly informed and fully self-controlled, make themselves better off by
doing so. If the individuals who compensate for changes in risk bore the full
burden of their behavior, these adjustments would necessarily improve
overall welfare by making the risk takers better off without making anyone else
worse off. However, in the case of AIDS, each seropositive person puts future
sexual and needle-sharing partners at risk. Thus, risk compensation in the
AIDS protection situation will not necessarily be benign. Behavior that is
personally rational may be socially devastating.
Moreover, some activities that risk HIV transmission also impose other
costs: infection with other diseases, unwanted pregnancy, drug dependency,
and crime. Personal precautions against HIV transmission may protect
against these side effects as well. The phenomenon of risk compensation
means that risk reducing interventions, such as facilitating partner screening,
will tend to increase the overall frequency of risky behavior, to cause that
frequency to decrease less than it otherwise would, or to diminish the use of
other risk reduction methods. Even if risk compensation does not lead to an
actual increase in the number of new HIV transmissions, it may still lead to
other unwanted results.
G. Measuring Costs and Benefits
The most important measure of success in fighting the AIDS epidemic is
the number of transmissions prevented. Because any intervention to reduce
HIV transmissions will cost someone something, it is necessary to have some
method to ensure that the costs of safety do not exceed its benefits. Further,
there are many different methods to limit the spread of AIDS. Each method
has different kinds of costs; policy makers must be able to compare and
choose among them. The first step toward addressing these concerns is to
quantify the value of preventing a single transmission of HIV.
Some of the costs of the epidemic-health care, lost wages and
productivity, the dollar costs of more condoms, and cleaner needles-are
easily quantifiable, at least in theory. The costs associated with suffering,
death, fear, and loss of liberty are more difficult to quantify. Furthermore, it
is often necessary to compare dollar costs to the loss of life. This problem is
not unique to AIDS policy; a solid body of work exists to guide policy makers.
When evaluating the worth of preventing an HIV transmission, the largest
factor involved is the value of the life saved. The life in question here is a
[Vol. 51 : No. I
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"statistical" life and not the life of an identified individual. 40 When a town
council decides whether to raise property taxes in order to double the budget
for life guards at the local pool, its members decide whether the reduction in
overall risk is worth the extra money and bad feelings associated with a tax
hike, not whether saving the life of a particular neighborhood child is worth
the tax increase.
Courts sometimes determine the value of a life by calculating the net
present value of the average person's lifetime earnings. 41 This method is
simple to use but provides biased valuations because it considers only the
value of labor services sold in the market. 42 Furthermore, this method is not
useful as an approximation of other measures which may be more
conceptually valid, but more difficult to evaluate. 43
Welfare economists attempt to determine the value of a life by measuring
the amount people are willing to pay to reduce small risks of death or serious
injury to themselves. This is the criterion of "willingness to pay."
Economists have developed two methods to estimate an individual's
willingness to pay: survey research and "revealed preferences." 44 The survey
approach, although it is commonly used to measure willingness to pay for
public goods, suffers from the difficulty of reproducing real choices in paper-
and-pencil exercises. 45 The revealed preferences method assumes that
market behavior reveals the trade-offs individuals are willing to make between
safety and money. Usually, wages in occupations involving unequal dangers
are compared to determine the premium workers demand for facing increased
risk. 46 These premiums are adjusted for morbidity and mortality rates to
determine the amount of premium paid per extra death; this is the willingness
to pay for a statistical life. Willingness to pay has been criticized on
theoretical grounds, and revealed preference on methodological ones, 47 but a
good alternative does not seem to be available.
Dollar estimates of the value of a life vary widely.48 Dillingham 49 cites
studies of labor market behavior which yield values ranging from $330,000 to
$5,390,000 and attributes much of this variation to differences in the defining
risk variables. Viscusi notes that different values may represent different
40. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
127, 127 (S. Chase ed. 1968).
41. Acton, Measuring the Monetary Value of Lifesaving Programs, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1976, at 46, 51. Zeckhauser, however, argues that there are shortcomings to courts' use of
compensation measures to value lives; these problems include the absence of analytic thinking from
the courts' determinations and the lack of "consistency across time or across jurisdictions in the
determination of financial amounts for damages." Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 450.
42. Acton, supra note 41, at 53.
43. For example, the net present value of a person's lifetime earnings does not consider the
continuation of that person's enjoyment of family and friends, nor does the measure consider their
enjoyment of that person. Id.
44. Id. at 62.
45. W. VISCUsi, RISK BY CHOICE 98 (1983).
46. Acton, supra note 41, at 62.
47. Id. at 63. See generally Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (1978).
48. See generally Blomquist, Estimating the Value of Life and Safety: Recent Developments, in THE VALUE
or LIFE AND SAFETY 27 (M. Jones-Lee ed. 1982).
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populations' preferences, and he chooses an estimate of $2 million as a
"reasonable" willingness to pay to avoid death by workers facing low-
moderate (1/10,000/yr.) risks of death. 50 This figure is considerably greater
than the present value of future earnings, implying that workers could not
afford to buy their own statistical lives at labor market rates. But this only
means that most people are risk averse with respect to risks as large as sudden
death, which is unsurprising. The high value placed on reducing small risks
does, however, mean that a large increase in total social risks, such as an
epidemic, will necessarily reduce willingness to pay for risk reduction.
Preventing two million premature deaths per year at a cost of $2 million each
would virtually exhaust the U.S. gross national product. 5' Thus, if HIV
spreads sufficiently, it could reduce the value that the United States as a
nation can afford to place on a human life.
The willingness to pay figures derived from labor markets are an imperfect
measure of the value of preventing HIV infection because they have to do
with sudden accidental death and not uncertain and deferred illness. But HIV
infection does not necessarily imply certain death; the virus has not been
noted in the human population long enough to determine long term survival
rates. Even for those who will develop AIDS, its cost should be discounted,
because death is usually years in the future. These two factors will tend to
make the willingness to pay to avoid HIV infection lower than the willingness
to pay to avoid job site risk.
On the other hand, several characteristics of HIV infection suggest that
willingness to pay to avoid instant death underestimates the willingness to pay
to avoid HIV infection. Death from AIDS often comes after a long and
horrible combination of illnesses; people would probably pay more to avoid
this than they would to avoid instant death. Furthermore, everyone who is
aware that he is infected with HIV lives in fear of illness and is aware that any
risky contact will endanger others. The resulting anxiety can be very
unpleasant. Finally, each new HIV infection carries with it the added costs of
any retransmission. Although it is unclear whether labor market estimates
overestimate or underestimate the value of preventing an HIV infection, it
would be difficult to conclude that this value is less than $1 million per
primary prevented infection.
These estimates have important implications for evaluating anti-AIDS
interventions. The costs of any proposed intervention can be compared to
the value of any transmissions the intervention can be expected to prevent.
Although economic analysis does not make it easier to compare trade-offs
involving civil liberties and life, it provides a method for evaluating arguments
49. Dillingham, The Influence of Risk Variable Definition on Value-of-Life Estimates, 23 ECON. INQUIRY
277, 279-80, 291 (1985) (The issue of Economic Inquiry in which Dillingharn's article appears is
incorrectly printed as part of Volume 24.).
50. W. Viscusi, supra note 45, at 106.
51. 1987 U.S. GNP = $4,526,700,000,000. The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts: Revised
Estimates, SURV. OF CURRENT Bus., July 1988, at 8, 34.
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over whether "enough" is being spent and for comparing the value of
different interventions.
H. The Statistical Logic of Testing
Screening programs are highly controversial, largely because they threaten
the interests of those tested.5 2 Policy makers must also bear in mind other
problems when considering implementing, or even allowing, testing of any
kind. These problems stem from interaction between the imperfections in the
test themselves and the statistical characteristics of tested populations.
Groups with different rates of infection will be differently vulnerable to false
positive and false negative results. A "false positive" is a test result which
indicates that an individual has the condition being tested for, when in fact the
person is healthy. A "false negative" is a result which indicates that a person
who in fact has the condition does not have it.
In the case of HIV tests, the consequences of both false positives and false
negatives are very grave. A false positive, even if it is kept completely
confidential, could have devastating psychological and social effects on a
healthy person. If such a person began to choose others who tested positive
as sexual partners, the results would be particularly grim. A false positive test
could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The consequences of a false negative
result are borne largely by those other than the person tested: sexual
partners, recipients of blood, or partners in needle sharing, all of whom
would be at risk of infection from an infected person believed to be free of
HIV.
In addition to the damage caused by particular false positive results, their
existence compromises the value of true positive results. A man told that he is
infected with HIV, and that he therefore poses a risk to any future sexual
partners, has, and may feel, a clear obligation to restrict his behavior. But
what is he to make of a finding that he is 72 percent likely to be infected?
From a strictly logical viewpoint, given that infection is a probabilistic process
anyway, the difference is not great. Psychologically, however, it may be
enormous.
53
A test's resistance to false positives is called its "specificity. ' 54 Resistance
to false negatives is called "sensitivity." 55 A sensitivity of 95 percent means
that of 100 persons with the condition in question, 95 will be expected to test
positive. A specificity of 90 percent means that of 100 persons free of the
condition, 90 will be identified correctly. It is not true that 90 percent of
those who test positive on a 90 percent specific test are actually infected or
52. See Bayer, Levine & Wolf, HIV Antibody Screening: An Ethical Framework for Evaluating Proposed
Programs, 256J.A.M.A. 1768, 1768 (1986) [hereinafter Bayer].
53. The author owes this point to comments at the March 21, 1988, session of the Analytic
Methods Seminar of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, made by Arthur I. Applebaum,
Fellow in Ethics of the Kennedy School.
54. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, Screening for HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits, and the Burden of Proof 14
L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 261 (1986) [hereinafter Barry].
55. Id.
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that 95 percent of those who test negative on a 95 percent sensitive test are
virus free. As an illustration, assume that the condition is present in 0.2
percent of the population being tested. Also, assume that the test for this
condition has: (1) a sensitivity of .95, or a false negative rate of 5 percent; and
(2) a specificity of .995 or, a false positive rate of 0.5 percent. Thus, a person
with the condition has a probability of .95 of having it detected, and one
without it has a probability of .995 of receiving the correct diagnosis.
However, only 28 percent of those who test positive will actually have the
condition; 72 percent of positive test results will be false. 56
The reason for this unexpected result is the rarity of the condition in the
tested population. Only 50 out of every 10,000 tests on healthy individuals
will yield a false result, and 9,500 of every 10,000 infected individuals will test
as infected. However, there are so many more healthy individuals than
infected ones that the false positives outnumber the true positives. 57 As the
frequency of the condition in the population being tested rises, false negatives
will rise in relation to true negatives. For the hypothetical test above, if 50
percent of those tested were infected, then 5 percent of all negative results,
but fewer than 1 percent of all positive results, would be false. Table II (see p.
331) illustrates the results of a test with the above characteristics when
performed on a population of 10,000 individuals. The first section of the
table depicts test results when 20 of the 10,000 are infected. The second
depicts the results of the same test when applied to a group in which 5,000 of
the 10,000 individuals are infected.
This statistical result has important implications for HIV screening
programs. So-called "AIDS tests" currently in use detect the presence of
antibodies to the virus-not the virus itself.5 8 Antibody testing is done in two
stages: (1) with an inexpensive and relatively simple test known as Enzyme
Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA); and (2) for all samples which
repeatedly test positive on ELISA, with the Western Blot test. 5 9 ELISA alone
will yield substantial numbers of false positives in a population with low
incidence of infection. Barry estimates that only 11.3 percent of positive
ELISA test results will be true positives in a population with a seroprevalence
of 0.03 percent 60 The Western Blot test eliminates most, but not all, of the
false positives of ELISA. 6 1 Thus, for groups with a very low incidence of
disease, such as those about to be married, the current testing procedure
would yield a large proportion of false positives even among those
"confirmed positive" by the second test.6 2
56. See Table II, infra 331.
57. The false positives are fewer than 1% of the healthy members of the tested population. The
true positives comprise 95% of the sick members of the tested population.
58. Barry, supra note 54, at 260.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 263.
61. Id. at 262.
62. Barry, Cleary and Fineberg estimate 30%. Id. at 263.
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TABLE II
FALSE POSITIVES AND FALSE NEGATIVES
Part 1: Test Results When 20 in 10,000 are Infected
Test Sensitivity = 95%, Test Specificity = 99.5%
False Results as % of
Total Negative Result Positive Result All Results in Group
Infected Individuals 20 1 19 5
Uninfected Individuals 9980 9930 50 0.5
Total 10,000 9931 69 0.5
False Results as 7 - 0.01 72.5 0.51
Of all Results
Part 2: Test Results When 5,000 in 10,000 are Infected
Test Sensitivity = 95%, Test Specificity = 99.5%
False Results as % of
Total Negative Result Positive Result All Results in Group
Infected Individuals 5000 250 4750 5
Uninfected Individuals 5000 4975 25 0.5
Total 10,000 5225 4775 2.75
False Results as 7 - 4.8 0.5 2.75
of All Results
As the prevalence of the condition rises, so does the probability that a positive test result will be correct. At
the same time, the probability that a negative test result is correct falls as the condition prevalence rises.
Thus, knowledge about risk factors is relevant even after test results are available: in the case of AIDS, a
heroin user with a positive test result is much more likely actually to be infected than a monogamous
heterosexual.
Populations having high seroprevalence present a greater risk of false
negative test results. 6 3 This reduces the assurance provided by any negative
test result. In addition to false negative test results due to testing errors and
test design, there are unavoidable false negatives due to the lag 64 between
infection with HIV and development of antibodies. During this lag,
individuals who are infected will not register as such on any antibody test. 65
Many members of high risk groups, such as male homosexuals and IV drug
users, also have other antibodies in their blood which tend to confound the
current tests. 66 The false positive rates for high risk groups are higher than
for the general population, although the proportion of all positive results which
are accurate remains higher for those groups than for lower risk groups.
Table III demonstrates the results for both high risk and low risk groups of a
63. Id. at 263-64, 266.
64. This lag averages three to twelve weeks. Id. at 262.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 261, 262.
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TABLE III
FALSE RESULTS WHEN SPECIFICITY AND PREVALENCE VARY
Part 1: Test Results When 20 in 10,000 are Infected
Test Sensitivity = 95%, Test Specificity = 99.5%
False Results as % of
Total Negative Result Positive Result All Results in Group
Infected Individuals 20 1 19 5
Uninfected Individuals 9980 9930 50 0.5
Total 10,000 9931 69 0.5
False Results as % - 0.01 72.5 0.51
Of all Results
Part 2: Test Results When 5,000 in 10,000 are Infected
Test Sensitivity = 95%, Test Specificity = 95%
False Results as % of
Total Negative Result Positive Result All Results in Group
Infected Individuals 5000 250 4750 5
Uninfected Individuals 5000 4750 250 5
Total 10,000 5000 5000 5
False Results as 7 - 5 5 5
of All Results
For some conditions, including HIV infection, test specificity can decline as condition prevalence rises.
This means that the percentage of uninfected individuals testing positive will be higher in "high risk
groups." However, as the table demonstrates, at reasonable changes in specificity high condition
prevalence more than outweighs this factor, and a positive test is still far more likely to be correct among
high risk populations than it is among low risk groups.
hypothetical medical test which is more likely to yield a false positive result for
the high risk group.
All current tests yield some false results of both types; there is no infallible
test. The condition tested for-the presence of virus genotype in T4 cells-is
not directly observable. Furthermore, attempts to culture the virus from an
individual's blood are also subject to false negative results.6 7 Because positive
results are more likely to be false in low risk groups and negative results more
likely to be false in high risk groups, accurate information about a testee's
sexual, drug, and transfusion history would improve test accuracy. Some gay-
rights advocates fear that this is another attempt to single out homosexuals
for discrimination. Furthermore, test administrators have to decide where to
set critical values on the Western Blot confirmatory test, which yields not a
simple "yes" or "no" but a range of values. 68 The higher the reading
required as a confirmation, the more selective, but the less sensitive, the test
will be. Test administrators also must decide what to tell testees whose results
67. Id. at 260.
68. Id. at 262.
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fall in an ambiguous range near the critical point. Developing extremely
accurate tests for low risk populations would be a very valuable activity, and
more accurate tests should be available soon. 69 The development of these
tests should eliminate many of the problems associated with false positives
and false negatives. It will not, however, mitigate the concerns about civil
liberties and confidentiality.
Although screening offers epidemiological information, it does little
directly to contain the virus's spread. Screening could be used merely to
subject testees to harassment and discrimination, neither of which helps
control the epidemic. But there are situations in which screening can assist in
the prevention of some HIV transmissions. Prison inmates, for example,
could be segregated by serum status. Infected prostitutes could be deterred
or incapacitated from further practicing their trade. In these cases, the
relative frequency of false positives is low, due to the prevalence of HIV
among the groups being tested, and the benefits of reducing contacts between
infected members of these groups and others are substantial. The questions
to be asked about any screening proposal are whether its epidemic control
benefits justify its costs, in terms of money, personal liberty, and social strife,
and whether it is the least cost way to achieve those benefits. 70
I. Identification Methods
All sexually active individuals have an interest in knowing the serum status
of their prospective sexual partners. But even if everyone knew his or her
own status, one could not assume completely accurate self-revelation. There
would be more assurance about prospective partners' status if testing were
supplemented by documentation.
Population groups and geographic areas vary in the benefits and costs that
would result from serum status identification programs. The seroprevalence
and transmission rates in some groups might justify the costs entailed while in
others it might not. Because of the externalities associated with infection and
illness, the social benefits from reduced HIV transmission will exceed the
private benefits in all population groups. Thus, rational individual choice and
market provided services may not deliver an optimal level of transmission
reduction; the market's failure to support an identification scheme does not
indicate that the costs of such a scheme exceed its benefits.
At current rates of HIV infection among non-IV-drug-using heterosexuals,
it is hard to imagine how any such system could be established or sustained
among the population at large, and such a proposal would run into massive
resistance among homosexuals. 7' Speculation on how such a system might
operate has, therefore, a somewhat science-fictional character. But thinking
about serum status identification may be a useful heuristic for thinking about
69. Cheap HIV Tests Imminent, New York Researcher Says, AIDS POL'Y & L., Apr. 8, 1987, at 6.
70. See Bayer, supra note 52, at 1769.
71. See R. SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 539-43
(1987).
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the dynamics of sexual sorting in the presence of HIV as a risk. Moreover, the
continued growth of infection rates might, in the future, begin to give
practical significance to the exercise.
An alternative to an open-ended identification system is the closed-ended
system of "safe sex" and "AIDS-free" clubs, or the HIV-screened dating
service. Such organizations have begun to appear, only to be denounced by
AIDS advocacy and education groups. Authorities have broken up at least
one club after allegations by such groups that the clubs cannot truly guarantee
safety and that they may in fact contribute to so much risk compensating
behavior as to increase transmission rates. 72 The latter claim seems
overdrawn, but the closed nature of such clubs limits the number they are
likely to protect, and the risk of exposing participants through outside contact
is still greater than it would be under a more universal system.
Any identification scheme has three basic problems: accuracy and veracity,
risk compensation, and the potential for discrimination against those who test
positive or merely participate in a screening program. Imagine the simplest
system. Testing centers could be established which would issue to any
individual who tests negative for HIV antibodies a dated document attesting
to that fact. Individuals would be urged to compare documents before
engaging in risky contacts. To help ensure accuracy, the government or
another institution would either sponsor or supervise the testing program. 73
The documents would have to be protected against both counterfeiting and
borrowing. Documents with holographs would greatly increase the difficulty
of making counterfeits; photographs could limit the extent of card sharing.
Counseling certain participants about potential false positive and false
negative test results would present great difficulties. Because participants
could not be expected to volunteer sensitive background information,
interpreting ambiguous test results would be difficult. Officials would have to
weigh the relative merits of placing subjects with ambiguous results in the
infected or the uninfected category. All ambiguous testees could be classified
as infected and provided intense counseling on the test results and repeated
testing to attempt to determine true serum status. Conversely, they could be
placed in the uninfected category and counseled on the potential danger they
may pose to others.
The more conservative approach, placing all ambiguous results in the
infected category, would have a number of costs if serum status identification
became commonplace among the sexually active. Uninfected individuals with
ambiguous test results would find themselves severely restricted in their
choice of sexual partners and it would be difficult for them to marry or have
72. Black, Shannon Halts Proposalfor AIDS-Free Social Club, Boston Globe, Aug. 8, 1987, at 17, col.
4.
73. However, the sponsorship of such a program by any health insurer-for example, the Red
Cross-would require strong legal barriers to the use of the data for insurance purposes and to
communication of the data to employers. Many individuals, especially members of high risk groups,
might still distrust such a system because of its sponsorship; in this case, the solution might be to
have advocacy groups among, for example, the homosexual community run the system.
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children. Further, if they did engage in sex with seropositive individuals, they
would be at a substantial risk of actually becoming infected. If all ambiguous
test results were assigned to the uninfected category, the opposite problems
would arise. Seropositive individuals could spread the infection to partners
who believed them to be healthy. Also, women who believe that they are
healthy could become pregnant and transmit the disease to newborns. Such
incidents would undermine the effectiveness of the entire system.
Regardless of the classification chosen, there would be two kinds of
unavoidable false negative results: persons infected too recently to have
developed antibodies and persons infected between the test date and the time
of contact.7 4 Sex with a tested "negative" would not be perfectly safe, only
safer than sex with an untested individual.
False positive and negative test results could also lead to "test shopping":
persons who initially tested positive seeking repeated tests in hopes that a
negative result would arise due to test errors. Such retesting could be
prevented only by maintaining a register of all test subjects and prohibiting
retesting of those already designated positive. Although such a register would
be analogous to the procedure the Red Cross follows with respect to blood
donors, fear of breaches of confidentiality would discourage many from taking
the test. This problem would tend to diminish in importance as the sensitivity
of the tests improved.
A serious problem with any card system would be restricting such cards to
their intended purpose-sexual sorting by serum status. Display of a serum-
negative card could become a formal or informal requirement for
employment and housing. Legal controls on requirements to display such a
card would be relatively ineffective as long as it remained possible for a
serum-negative individual to voluntarily display it any time. Failure to
voluntarily display it would attract an unfavorable inference.
Unless cards were universally carried, it would be quite difficult to
distinguish a seropositive individual from a mere nonparticipant in the
system. Since no one has any incentive to falsely claim infected status, there
would be no purpose in issuing cards showing positive serum status;
therefore, the cards would effectively confer a privilege. An ingenious
solution to part of this problem is to encourage everyone to carry a pendant or
bracelet testifying to participation in the testing scheme. 75 Those with
negative test results would be issued pendants capable of being opened to
display the negative testing documentation with its date. In this way, a stigma
could be placed on nonparticipation-thus inviting as many as possible to join
the scheme-without immediately stigmatizing those with unfavorable test
results. Possession and display of the pendant or bracelet would be an open
invitation to compare notes before engaging in otherwise risky contact. This
74. This latter risk would be minimized if participants limited their contact to other participants;
the rate of new infections among diligent card users would not be zero, but it would be very small.
75. THE CHECKMATE COMMrrTEE, THE CHECKMATE PROPOSAL: A SUMMARY OF THE BOOK IN
PROGRESS 19-20 (1987).
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scheme, however, does not create a technological barrier against the risk of
being coerced into displaying one's negative status.
A little additional technical ingenuity could greatly alleviate this problem.
Because the purpose of the system is not to allow seronegatives to
demonstrate their freedom from infection, but to prevent risky contact across
seropositive/seronegative lines, it is never necessary for anyone to be able to
demonstrate his or her own serum status, but only to have an unambiguous
way to identify the relative serum status of a potential pair. The ideal device in
this case would be a "smart card"--a microchip, an interface device, and a
display-which would not disclose its owner's serum status. When any two
smart cards were linked, however, they would display green lights if each had
the same reading and red lights if they had different readings, or if either card
was outdated. Such devices could be mass produced for about $25 each. 76 In
addition to emphasizing the symmetry between seropositive and seronegative
persons, such a system would give technological backing to legal prohibitions
on demands for unilateral displays of seronegativity. To abuse the system, a
would-be discriminator would have to actively participate in a crime. Thus,
law and custom could restrict the comparison of devices to intimate situations.
A third party watching the comparison would learn next to nothing about the
status of each participant because a red light would mean only that one or the
other participant was seropositive or had an outdated card.
If at some point in the future conditions called for a system of
technologically assisted partner screening as an epidemic control device,
there would remain the problem of how to introduce the custom of acquiring,
displaying, and using such devices. Should the display of the device itself be
ppen? How could one prevent mere possession of such a device being taken
as an admission of an intent to engage in promiscuous sex or membership in a
high risk group? If the government will not sponsor the program, who will?
Would any sponsor be able to gain the necessary trust of the populace?
"Smart cards" carrying medical history information have been proposed
before to simplify the history and physical process in routine medical care, to
ease records transfer among health care providers, and to avoid life
threatening mistakes in emergencies. Combining this function with HIV-
status identification could reduce the net cost of the HIV screening
application and greatly improve the cards' acceptability among low risk
populations. But the only plausible sponsor for such a system would be the
health insurance industry. Such sponsorship would be greatly problematic as
long as health insurers retain their own financial interests in learning, and in
some cases communicating to employers, individuals' HIV infection status.
Despite problems with test sensitivity, specificity, and lags between
infection and antibody production, a card system would reduce enormously
the riskiness of any given level of promiscuous sexual contact. However, risk
compensation could be a problem. If reliance on a card system were
76. Confidential conversation.
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substituted for other risk control measures, the system's effect on the
transmission rate would be ambiguous. If a card system led to increased
numbers of contacts or decreased condom use, it would tend to increase
unwanted pregnancy and the transmission of other diseases.
J. Three Views of the AIDS Policy Debate
Controlling the AIDS epidemic does not create the same kind of policy
debate as deciding how much to spend on building roads or choosing the
patent life to give to new drugs. Virtually everyone engaged in the road
building or patent life debates assumes that the best decision is the one that
leads to the best results and that the debate consists of arguing about what the
consequences of different options will be and how they ought to be valued.
Philosophically, and as applied to the entire subject of moral choice, this view
is called "consequentialism." 77 As taught professionally in schools of public
policy, it goes by the name of "policy analysis." In confronting AIDS, two
other views of the nature of public choice and styles of policy debate compete
with consequentialist policy analysis.
One view asserts that some actions of private persons are virtuous, while
others are (in the root meaning of the word) vicious; that public authority
should promote virtues and suppress vices; and that policies to do so are
"right" and their opposites are "wrong" in ways not fully reducible to their
good or bad consequences, or that toleration of vice inevitably has bad
consequences even when the causal chain cannot be traced. The content of
the categories of virtue and vice may be held to follow from definitions of
"right" and "wrong," 78 from fundamental statements about human nature, 79
or they may be taken to represent divine commandments revealed'by one or
another sacred text or religious tradition.80 A philosophically distinct, but
operationally similar, view holds that the particular views about virtue and
vice held by any society are arbitrary, but that the maintenance of such
traditional views is a central task of political institutions because it is essential
to social well-being. 8 1 The notion that "right" and "wrong" are logically
independent of "good" and "bad" defines a "deontological," as opposed to a
"consequentialist," view of moral choice. Such views are likely to be called
"moral" by their proponents and "moralistic" by others. This article will
refer to this deontological view as "moralist" beliefs or "moralism."
77. Confusingly, consequentialism is often referred to as "utilitarianism," which is properly the
name of the version of consequentialism holding that the only relevant consequences of an action are
its effects on the pleasures and pains of individuals.
78. For an example of such moralist thought, see I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF ETHICS (0. Manthey-Zorn trans. 1938).
79. This seems to be the view that Plato attributes to Socrates in the Phaedo. It is also the
traditional reading of Aristotle's Politics and Nicomachean Ethics.
80. For an example of such an interpretation, see generally T. AQUINAS, ON THE TRUTH OF THE
CATHOLIC FAITH, BOOK 3 (V. Bourke trans. 1956).
81. See generally M. OAKESHor, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1962); E. BURKE,
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (C. O'Brien ed. 1968).
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The other nonconsequentialist view comes from those who oppose direct
state interference with private choices when this interference is based on
moralist grounds. This view may derive from a belief that individual self-rule
is a human right and that state interference is morally wrong apart from its
consequences,82 or it may rest on the proposition that the political process
will decide these matters badly and should therefore be forbidden to decide
them at all, even if in some instances moralistic laws may have good effects.8 3
Some American proponents claim that this view represents the Founders'
intention and is enshrined in the Constitution and its amendments,
particularly the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment.8 4 In the text
that follows, all of these views will be referred to as "libertarian."
Moralism, libertarianism, and consequentialism are each subject to telling
criticism. Moralism is always a particular moralism, and its introduction into
policy debate will always be seen by those who do not share it as representing
an attempt to capture state power for sectarian ends. By its nature, moralism
tends to be blind to the bad consequences that imperfect compliance with the
laws may cause. Too many moralists are tinged with ill will toward those of
bad character, as they define it.85
Libertarianism fails to recognize the problems of self-command86 and
involves an excessively narrow view of the consequences of unconstrained
private pleasure seeking on the competence and public spirit of those on
whose performance as parents, neighbors, and citizens any republic must
rely. 8 7 The libertarian fear of undue state interference lends libertarians to
subject proposals designed to control "vice" to a nearly impossible standard
of demonstrated harm.88
Consequentialist policy analysis is inevitably biased toward the
measurable, short term effects of the policies it considers. The well-trained
policy analyst will omit from his or her calculations the slow effects of policies
on norms and customs. However, if private character is important and
influenced by the public action under consideration, this will lead to mistakes.
The policy-analytic tradition tends to neglect the effect that merely
announcing a policy can have on social and private character. The process of
policy making itself, through the rhetoric employed and the respect paid or
82. See generally R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
83. This is so because moralist arguments are hard to resolve and the passions they generate
tend to distort political discourse. An example of a work which adopts this view is J. MILL, ON
LIBERTY (1859) (G. Himmelfarb ed., rev. ed. 1984).
84. Dorsen, Introduction, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS viii-xiv (N. Dorsen ed. 1984).
85. For an eloquent statement of the dangers posed by moralistic ill will to republican
institutions, see Lincoln, Temperance Address of February 22, 1846, in COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 271 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
86. See generally Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Summer
1980, at 94; see also Schelling, Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command, in 4 THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 43 (S. McMurrin ed. 1983) (discussing failure to recognize the problems of self-
command).
87. See generally Kleiman, Liberalism and Vice Control, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 242 (1987).
88. See, e.g., Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitutional Law: Prolegomenon to a Theory of
the Constitutional Right to Privacy, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.. Winter 1988, at 123.
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denied persons and groups, may directly influence preferences and
customs.8 9  Further, policy analysis treats the process of public
decisionmaking as a rational actor to which prescriptive advice can be given
rather than as one social process among many, ruled by its own descriptive
laws. Thus, traditional policy analysis ignores the importance of public or
constitutional taboos on the process of public choice. 90
Although moralist and libertarian strains run deep in American thought,
political arguments in the United States are usually framed in consequentialist
terms. By attempting to provide consequentialist rationales for positions
chosen on other grounds, both moralists and libertarians may be forced into
unjustified factual assertions and analytical errors. Both groups represent
values that are important for informed public decisionmaking, but values
should not be allowed to masquerade as facts and inferences.
III
APPLICATIONS
The balance of this essay will examine the categories of HIV transmission,
the range of possible interventions, and the consequences of those policies for
the sick, the infected, and the uninfected. It will evaluate the likely responses
to proposed interventions of those who enter the debate as guardians of
public morals and civil liberties. The program to control HIV in the blood
supply is an example of quick and effective action to limit transmission. This
program was successful because of technically favorable circumstances and a
(relative) lack of political controversy. Unfortunately, these circumstances are
not reproduced for the problems of sexual and drug-related transmission.
A. Blood Transfusion
HIV can be transmitted by the transfusion of blood from an infected to an
uninfected person. Steps have therefore been taken to screen donors and to
test blood. Currently, those measures are largely noncontroversial, because
virtually no one considers giving blood to be a personal right, nor receiving
blood to be a vice. Matters might have been very different if many people had
shared the view of the Jehovah's Witnesses that blood transfusion falls under
the Biblical proscription against "eating blood." 91 Proponents of that view
would have pointed out that AIDS was divine punishment for the sin of
transfusion and that it could be controlled only by reducing the number of
transfusions. The screening of donors would have been regarded as a
technological solution to a behavioral problem, a solution likely, due to a risk-
89. For a critique emphasizing the independent importance of proclaimed policies and political
processes, see S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? 153-55 (1981).
90. For a classical statement of the policy-analytic tradition, see E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A
PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978).
91. Leviticus 17:10-14; see also H. BorrING & G. BOrrING, THE ORWELLIAN WORLD OF JEHOVAH'S
WITNESSES 29-30 (1984).
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compensation-induced increase in transfusion activity, to accelerate the
spread of other transfusion-borne diseases such as hepatitis.
In practice, however, no one proposed reducing the frequency of
transfusions. It was possible to reduce specific risk of transfusions of various
blood factors, but not of whole blood.92 The only remaining option was the
segregation of the blood of HIV positive donors from recipients.
The Red Cross uses a two-step process to keep the blood supply free of
HIV. 93 First, all prospective donors are given literature which reflects the
most current understanding of HIV transmission and infection risks.94 Red
Cross personnel make sure that potential donors read the material in their
presence, and encourage anyone who believes himself or herself to be at risk
to leave before completing the rest of the process. 95 Those who do not leave
are then asked to fill out a screening questionnaire, and any who appear to be
at risk for HIV are again encouraged to leave.96 At this juncture, all potential
donors are given the opportunity to indicate on a "confidential unit
exclusion" form that they wish to donate but do not want their blood
transfused; 97 this allows people in situations where donating blood is a social
effort (such as employee blood drives) to avoid stigmatization while still
protecting the blood supply.
The second stage of the Red Cross screening process involves the donated
blood itself. Donated blood is first tested with ELISA, and blood which tests
positive for HIV antibodies is tested a second and third time.98 If a positive
finding is confirmed by ELISA two out of three times, the blood in question is
thrown out, and the donor's name is flagged in the confidential Donor
Deferral Registry so that any subsequent donations can be discarded. 99 The
Western Blot test is then conducted to verify the results of the ELISAs. 00 If
the final test is positive, the donor is notified that he or she is seropositive and
should not donate.' 0 ' If the positive finding is not confirmed, the donor is
not notified, due to the possibility of false positive results, but his or her name
remains in the Donor Deferral Registry.10 2 Thus, the notion that the Red
Cross "tests blood, not people" is at best a half-truth, but no one has chosen
to make an issue of it.
92. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 54 (HIV does not survive a heating process which leaves the factors
intact.).
93. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, BLOOD SERVICES DIRECTIVE ("B.S.D.") 5.29: DONOR
PROCESSING AND MANAGEMENT 2-3, attachment V-2 (rev. Apr. 1988); B.S.D. 4.56: NOTIFICATION,
COUNSELLING AND MEDICAL EVALUATION OF DONORS WITH REPEATABLY POSITIVE HTLV III ANTIBODY
TEST RESULTS 1-2 (May 1985); B.S.D. 6.52: TESTING FOR HTLV-III ANTIBODY AND DISPOSITION OF
AIDS-SUSPECT BLOOD 3-4 (rev. Feb. 1985).
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The current smooth functioning of the donor deferral and blood testing
system stands in sharp contrast to the vigorous debate it aroused when first
proposed. The blood banking industry, concerned about costs, bad publicity,
the loss of potential donors, and consequent possible blood shortages, put up
a strong fight against the notion that AIDS could be spread through the blood
system. At the same time, some gay-rights organizations opposed any
screening by risk history and any testing of donated blood due to concerns
about the confidentiality of donor deferral lists and reinforcement of the
connection in the public mind between homosexuality and the spread of the
virus. 10 3 Partly as a result, it was more than a year after the evidence of
transfusion related cases was clear before the announcement of the first donor
deferral guidelines. 104
The prescreening of risk groups and the flagging of donors who have
tested positive are necessary because of false negative results, particularly
those due to the lag in antibody development. A recently exposed donor may
test negative although his blood carries the virus.' 0 5 The spread of HIV
outside the currently identified risk groups will severely limit the effectiveness
of prescreening in protecting the blood supply.
Compliance with Red Cross requests for risk group members not to
donate appears to have been very good. The combination of donor deferral
and HIV testing has greatly reduced the probability of transmission of HIV by
transfusion.' 0 6 The reduction in the probability of receiving infected blood
has overwhelmed any compensating increases in transfusion frequency. No
one with any significant influence regards the blood question as one of public
morality. Although some of the steps taken appear to have the characteristics
which worry libertarians and gay-rights groups under other circumstances, no
one feels threatened by them in the blood bank context. This contrasts
sharply with the more controversial routes of infection.
B. Heterosexual Activity
Men can transmit HIV to women in anal, vaginal, and oral intercourse. 0 7
Women can transmit to men in anal and vaginal intercourse.' 0 8 In
heterosexual activity, the specific risk to a male under U.S. conditions may be
substantially lower than the specific risk to a female.' 0 9 Conditions in Central
Africa are different; there, AIDS spreads predominantly through heterosexual
103. R. SHILTS, supra note 71, at 170-71, 220-26.
104. Id. at 243.
105. This has happened at least once. See Centers for Disease Control, Transfusion-Associated
Human T-Lymphotropic Virus, Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infection from a Seronegative
Donor-Colorado, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 389, 389-90 (1986).
106. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 53 ("Self-exclusion of donors who are members of high risk groups
... began in 1983 and no doubt reduced the risk of exposure to HIV among transfusion patients.").
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id.
109. E. NICHOLS, MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS 27 (1986). But see Mueller, The Epidemiology of the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 14 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 250, 256 (1986).
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contact, with men and women at about equal risk. 110 The higher incidence of
lesion-producing skin diseases and of untreated venereal disease in Central
Africa may account for the difference.
With homosexual and IV spread limited to comparatively small
subpopulations and the blood supply currently under reasonable control, the
rate and pattern of heterosexual spread will determine whether AIDS in the
United States will claim "only" hundreds of thousands of lives or many
millions. Recent news is mildly encouraging.
If bisexuals and IV-using prostitutes were spreading the virus across a
broad population spectrum, and if the heterosexual population, thus seeded,
were sustaining an internal epidemic with the very short doubling times
characteristic of the early stages of the epidemic among homosexuals, the
rapid spread of seroprevalence in the general population would be reflected
in AIDS among newborns, even if not reflected in clinical AIDS cases due to
the long incubation period."1 ' That is not happening. The vast majority of
children born with AIDS are the children of IV-using mothers or of mothers
with IV-using sex partners."12
This relatively good news may mean only that society has some time to
deal with the problem. If the expected lifetime transmission rate through
heterosexual contact is greater than one, 113 seroprevalence in the general
population will continue to rise until saturation among relatively careless
subpopulations of heterosexuals, and epidemic-driven behavioral change,
pushes that rate below one. The number of new infections in each time
period will tend to rise, ceteris paribus, as the rise in seroprevalence increases
the chance that a randomly selected heterosexual partner is infected. The
disease has a great deal of time to spread before subjective appreciation of
reality of heterosexual transmission' 4 generates major behavioral changes,
particularly if the development of the disease among infected individuals is
slow. A glacier does not move as fast as an avalanche, but it gets the job done.
No one knows how far or how fast the disease will spread, partly because
no one knows the contact specific risk of different forms of sexual contact.
110. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 75; Clumeck, Robert-Guroff, Van De Perre, Jennings, Sibornana,
Demol, Gran & Gallo, Seroepidemiological Studies of HTL V-III Antibody Prevalence Among Selected Groups of
Heterosexual Africans, 254 J.A.M.A. 2599, 2599 (1985).
11I. Of children born to seropositive mothers, estimates of the proportion which will be born
infected with HIV vary. See N.A.S., supra note 1, at 56-57 (citing Scott, Fischel, Kimas, Fletcher,
Dickinson, Levine & Parks, Mothers of Infants with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Evidence for Both
Symptomatic and Asymptomatic Carriers, 253 J.A.M.A. 363, 363-66 (1985) (65%); also citing Centers for
Disease Control, Recommendations for Assisting in the Prevention of Perinatal Transmission of Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 721, 731 (1986) (estimates vary from 0% to 22%)).
112. See Rogers, Thomas, Starcher, Noa, Bush & Jaffe, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in
Children: Report of the Centers for Disease Control National Surveillance, 1982 to 1985, 79 PEDIATRICS 1008,
1010 (1987) (Table 1 at 1010 describes risk factors associated with pediatric AIDS cases).
113. This would occur if, on average, each infected heterosexual is responsible for infecting even
a fraction more than one person.
114. This is likely to come only when acquaintances or celebrities who are heterosexually infected
start to sicken and die.
342 (Vol. 51 : No. I
AIDS, VICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
For example, if the specific risk to the female in unprotected vaginal
intercourse without any potential co-factors turns out to be near 0.001 (one-
tenth of one percent), and if the specific risk to the male is even smaller, the
disease will not spread very rapidly among non-IV-using heterosexuals."
5 It
is possible that specific risk rises in proportion to the proportion of the
infected partner's T4 cells which carry the HIV genome. This in turn rises
almost exponentially with the time from initial exposure." 6 If that were true,
specific risk in heterosexual contact would tend to increase with time, and the
lack of cases among newborns outside heroin-using areas might prove to be a
false indicator of the long term risk of a very wide epidemic in the United
States.
The greater the specific risks, the more likely the infection is to spread.
However, the fact that heterosexual intercourse is less dangerous to men than
it is to women is a mixed blessing, because it reduces the self-interest of males
in safer practices and throws much of the burden of responsibility for
epidemic control on females. This may tend to produce a move back in the
direction of pre-Pill sexual practices, with AIDS substituting for pregnancy as
the topic of greater concern to women than to men. Since there is still great
uncertainty about specific risks, it is still possible that controlling heterosexual
spread will be a major national health need. Within minority populations in
some urban areas, the importance of doing so is already clear.
Changes in frequency, specific risks, and the contact rate between infected
and uninfected individuals could reduce HIV transmission through
noncommercial heterosexual contact. These changes might result from
changes in sexual customs and practices, which are subject to public
intervention of at least two kinds: (1) actions directly imposing punishments
and rewards on sexual activity and its observable consequences; and
(2) actions which affect the form and content of what is heard and seen about
sex in the schools and in the media. A number of possible changes in both
laws and messages could help reduce HIV spread. But the other results of
such actions are likely to be sufficiently great and controversial that their
merits as epidemic control measures will be almost irrelevant to their political
fate.
The proportion of heterosexual contacts involving one infected and one
uninfected party does not depend solely on changes in overall sexual mores
115. If the specific risk to the female is 1/1000, then a female choosing a new partner at random
from a male heterosexual population with a seroprevalence of 0.5% every six months for twenty
years and having unprotected intercourse with each partner three times each week would face a risk
of infection over that period of I - [I - [0.005 * [I - (I - 0.001)S]] = 0.0149, or just under
1.5%.
One other encouraging note, though not yet verified, is the possibility that a genetic susceptibility
to infection exists and is tied to a similar susceptibility to illness once infected. See supra text
accompanying note 2. This would imply that current measures of specific risk and disease expression
rates are biased upward due to sample selection, and that rates of infection and of illness will decline
in the future.
116. Telephone conversation with David Kanouse, Senior Scientist, Rand Corporation (Feb.
1988).
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due to changes in laws and messages," 17 it can also be influenced by policies
making it easier or more difficult for potential bedmates to determine each
other's HIV status.
1. Reducing Frequency. Other things held constant, reducing the frequency
of sexual contact between men and women would probably reduce the rate of
heterosexual transmission of HIV. The sexual counterrevolution which
started with the fear of herpes seems to have picked up some steam from the
fear of AIDS. 118 Concern about AIDS is likely to continue to grow, 1 9 but
little is known about what causes sexual frequency to vary over time or across
cultures or populations. Serious research about who does what, how often,
and with whom sexually is almost nonexistent; the outdated and
methodologically laughable Kinsey reports 120 have not been improved on, or
even repeated. In "the good old days, when sex was dirty and the air was
clean," was overall sexual frequency lower? No one knows. A large part of
the AIDS research budget should be devoted to behavioral studies to identify
some of the determinants of sexual behavior and perhaps find ways to
influence behavior to reduce the transmission of HIV.
The mix of messages about sex conveyed by the mass media and schools is
one plausible candidate for intervention. If changing the frequency of food
cues affects food consumption,' 2 ' why should not changing the frequency of
sex cues influence the overall rate of copulation? How plausible is it that the
deluge of pro-sex messages has no effect on sexual frequency?
Sex education directed at controlling HIV transmission could focus on
reducing the frequency of sexual contact and on raising the age of sexual
initiation. Such messages, presented in a fashion similar to current anti-drug
messages, would please some moralists. But the effectiveness of anti-drug
messages is unknown and there is no way to predict the effects of an anti-sex
campaign. Such a campaign might tend to increase specific risk by interfering
with the technical side of sex education. Whether one thinks that this side
effect would be good or bad partially depends on empirically answerable
questions 122 and partly on evaluative ones. 123
The mass media give messages relevant to frequency, the mix of acts, the
use of condoms, and the number of partners. Even if we could determine the
117. This dependency arises from changes in the number of sexual partners individuals are
inclined to have in light of overall sexual mores.
118. See generally Leishman, Heterosexuals and AIDS, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 37; The
Revolution is Over, TIME, Apr. 9, 1984, at 74.
119. See generally Leishman, supra note 118; see also The Revolution is Over, supra note 118.
120. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
121. Several studies have shown a relationship between food cue prominence and food-directed
performance, especially among obese subjects. See, e.g., Schacter & Friedman, The Effects of Work and
Cue Prominence on Eating Behavior, in OBESE HUMANS AND RATS 11 (S. Schacter &J. Rodin eds. 1974);
Ross, Effects of Manipulating Salience of Food upon Consumption by Obese and Normal Eaters, in OBESE
HUMANS AND RATS, supra, at 43; Johnson, The Effects of Cue Prominence and Obesity on the Effort to Obtain
Food, in OBESE HUMANS AND RATS, supra, at 53.
122. For example, what is the net effect on the rate of unwanted pregnancies?
123. For example, what are "healthy" or "moral" sexual attitudes or behaviors?
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impact of rampant sexual stimulation in print, in music, and on big and small
screens, there would be substantial barriers to public action aimed at
changing their content. The concerns of moralists and libertarians have
dominated the censorship debates for years. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly sided with the libertarians; 124 television and radio are the only
media where substantial censorship is allowed. 125 Television is censored
largely by the industry itself, often with perverse effects. There are an
overwhelming number of sexual images and interludes on network television,
but condom ads are largely banned as potentially offensive. 126
Changing messages is not the only means of influencing sexual frequency.
A strong body of laws and customs once existed to minimize extramarital
frequency. Nosey hotel clerks, laws prohibiting premarital sex, adultery, open
cohabitation, and so forth, were all fairly common at one time. Although their
effectiveness has never been determined, these laws probably had some effect:
Still, it is unlikely that these laws will be revived. Even if one were very willing
to trade privacy and personal autonomy for epidemic control, that trade
probably can be made on more favorable terms in other policy areas.
2. Reducing Specific Risk. The specific risks of male-to-female and female-to-
male transmission depend on the mix of sex acts and the frequency of
condom use. The presence of other sexually transmitted diseases may also
matter.
Messages in the schools and mass media could affect knowledge and
attitudes about safe and risky forms of contact and about the proper use of
condoms and other barriers. Sex education in the schools might be a useful
forum for education on reducing specific risk, and the Surgeon General and
others have promoted it as such, 1 27 but the content of sex education can vary
greatly. Some moralists may worry that sex education involves the delivery of
pro-sex messages to children, and it is certainly conceivable that some
curricula may, on balance, have such an effect. Thus, attempts to reduce
specific risks may interfere with attempts to reduce frequency.
Libertarians, who think information is always good, favor sex education
but are nervous about teaching anything that looks like morality, because it
will always be a particular morality. It is hard to see how broader technical
knowledge and competence about how to avoid the sexual spread of disease
could do harm in terms of epidemic control, but it is easy to foresee furious
arguments about "value-free" sex education or about the mix of values to be
promoted. What sort of sex education will produce sexual attitudes most
consistent with minimizing HIV transmission is unknown, or at least disputed.
There is some evidence that the mix of value-free information, scare
messages, and negative exhortation that composed drug education in the
124. See L. HURWITZ, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF CENSORSHIP IN THE U.S. at xlvi-Ixiii (1985).
125. Id. at 31, 103-04.
126. Koop Urges TV Condom Ads to Fight AIDS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1987, at AI, col. 4.
127. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 5 (1987).
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1960's actually increased the use of illicit drugs among its audiences. In any
case, the other consequences and principles at stake are important enough
that the HIV-infection-minimizing sex education program is not necessarily
the optimal education program overall.
Sex education need not be limited to youngsters. Adults could benefit
greatly from increased knowledge of how to avoid infection. The extent of
behavioral change required to stem HIV transmission is daunting, particularly
in light of how unwilling much of the population has been to change smoking,
eating, drinking, and exercise habits. Still, there is evidence that condom use
increases following intensive education and information campaigns on its
benefits. 128
From the epidemic control viewpoint, the right mix of policies might
involve increased sex education in the schools and government action to
reduce the mass media's dose of messages in support of casual unprotected
sex. Supporting both policies at once, however, requires a willingness to
ignore or discount the potential side effects of such policies on other sexually
transmitted diseases, unintended pregnancies, family structure, and cultural
attitudes toward sex roles. Supporting both policies at once suggests a
willingness to support or oppose the sexual counterrevolution
opportunistically, as it happens to be good or bad for AIDS epidemic control,
and to ignore or discount first amendment issues. Such willingness is not
widely shared. Even if it were, the absence of data would prevent any
consensus on policy.
3. Reducing Seropositive/Seronegative Contacts. The remaining option is to
influence seropositive/seronegative contact patterns. This in turn could come
either from a reduction in the number of sexual partners or from partner
screening.
Reducing the number of partners reduces risk by reducing the chances of
encountering at least one infected partner. It increases in importance as the
product of the infection rate among potential partners and the specific risk
per act rises.
Partner screening could involve personal judgment about likely risk
factors, closed-circle AIDS-free clubs which attempt to combine the pleasures
of variety with the safety of fidelity, or testing. As long as HIV risk is
correlated with observable factors such as age and ethnicity, unassisted
judgment will improve one's odds, but with substantial errors, both false
positive and false negative. The clubs will presumably serve only a small
minority and will face substantial compliance problems.
Testing is far more accurate than guessing and could serve a large
population. If a serum status identification system were in place, couples
could routinely check to see that potential partners were compatible. In the
heterosexual population, such a system would allow the uninfected majority
128. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 98.
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largely to disregard the threat of infection. This could lead to a decrease in
safe sex aid an increase in the average number of partners. However, given
the inevitable leakage from false negatives and risky contacts, this risk
compensating behavior might vitiate the benefits of an identification system.
An "HIV-free" identification system would tend to deprive infected
heterosexuals of sexual opportunities except to the extent that seropositives
were able to seek one another out. That effect seems desirable because an
infected person's interest in having sexual opportunity is outweighed by the
interests of the uninfected in remaining so. An identification system would
greatly benefit minority group populations in some cities. In New York, for
example, it is reasonable to think that seroprevalence among minority men
aged 20 to 40 is high enough to confront minority females with some
excruciating choices in the absence of any HIV status identification scheme.
4. Premarital Screening: A Special Case. Screening for HIV has been proposed
as a condition of marriage in a number of states and has been endorsed by the
President and the Secretary of Education.' 29 It is now law in Illinois and
Louisiana.' 30 Such proposals, which intend to reduce the frequency of HIV
transmission within marriage and the number of HIV-positive children born,
have been attacked as illogical, oppressive, and impractical. From a viewpoint
restricted to couples planning to marry, these labels are undeserved;
premarital testing seems, under plausible assumptions, a reasonable
investment, and there are strong arguments for making testing mandatory
rather than relying on negotiations between each prospective bride and
groom. From a broader viewpoint, however, premarital testing may be less
desirable because it will tend to reduce the frequency of intramarital
transmission only at the expense of increasing the frequency of extramarital
transmission.' 3 ' The net effect remains unclear.' 32
Because both sex and procreation can and do occur outside the bond of
marriage, preventing marriage does not necessarily prevent transmission of
the virus. This observation, although logically correct, is not conclusive. The
question is not whether the test will prevent all transmissions among tested
couples or to children, only whether it will prevent some, and at what monetary
and other costs. Again, the fact that in some couples transmission will
already have occurred reduces the benefits of premarital testing without
eliminating them. If the application for a marriage license is no more than a
convenient and customary point at which the state can intervene, that may be
reason enough to proceed if the benefits justify the cost.
129. Dewar & Boodman, Reagan Favoring Testingfor AIDS, Boston Globe, May 22, 1987, at 1, col.
4.
130. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:230(B),
231(B) (West Supp. 1988).
131. Mockler & Kleiman, With This Test I Thee Wed: Evaluating Premarital AIDS Testing, 7 J. POL.
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 557, 560 (1988).
132. Id. at 560, 561.
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It has also been argued that premarital screening is an unjustified invasion
of the privacy and liberty of couples intending to marry. If either party is
sufficiently concerned about his or her partner being infected, the argument
goes, then he or she should insist on a test; why should the state intervene?
To this there are four answers. First, as argued above, the transmission of
HIV is not a matter of public indifference; if, as a result of a failure to test, one
party in the marriage transmits HIV to the other or an infected child is born,
not all of the costs will be borne by the couple involved. Second, a
seropositive person who marries a seronegative person puts him or her at very
substantial peril; a decision to marry in ignorance of infection is not one taken
in the unconstrained exercise of personal freedom. If there is a clear moral
duty to inform a potential sex partner of one's HIV status, why should the
state not legally enforce that duty when it conveniently can? Third, the
asymmetry in risk between the genders may combine with other asymmetries
in the relationship to distort the results of premarital negotiation; women, as
the chief potential beneficiaries, may be unable or unwilling to insist. Fourth,
if testing were voluntary, insisting on a test at the point of marriage might be
taken to indicate a lack of trust; more couples might be broken up by disputes
about whether to take the test than would be by the test results.
Objections on grounds of liberty would be better justified if it were
proposed that a positive HIV test be a bar to marriage, rather than merely a
fact which must be revealed to the potential spouse. In any case, the fact that
persons forbidden to marry could still have sex and conceive children would
greatly limit the ability of such a law to prevent transmission.
The practical objections to mandatory premarital testing-the frequency
of false positive results and the substantial financial cost per true detection-
both arise from the presumably low seroprevalence among persons intending
to marry. If only 0.03 percent of couples intending to marry have at least one
infected partner, then 24 percent of the reported "positive" results will be
false. 133 Thus, if tests were administered to each of the 1.9 million couples
getting married in the United States each year, 1,000 couples would be
correctly identified as involving an infected man and an uninfected woman.
According to one estimate, the costs of such a program, including counseling
for those testing positive and their partners, would total over $100 million, or
roughly $50 per couple. 3 4 This estimate assumes that all tested couples will
also receive counseling about the meaning of the tests and about HIV
transmission. If, instead, only couples in which one or both partners tested
positive received counseling, per-couple costs (averaging the majority that
receives testing only and the minority requiring counseling as well) would fall
to about $15.
133. The calculations are made in detail in Barry, supra note 54, at 263.
134. See Cleary, Barry, Mayer, Brandt, Gostin & Fineberg, Compulsory Premarital Screening for the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J.A.M.A. 1757, 1760 (1987). See also M. Kleiman & R. Mockler,
Mandatory Pre-Marital AIDS Testing 4 (unpublished paper for Analytical Methods Seminar at
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Mar. 21, 1988).
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Under such assumptions, the benefits of the program to the marrying
couples could easily cover its costs. Even if only 20 percent of the women
involved avoided infection either by breaking off the engagement or
practicing safe sex, the prevention of 200 infections at a cost of $100 million
represents a cost per prevented transmission of only $500,000. The reader
should consider whether he or she would voluntarily accept a one-in-one
hundred risk of HIV infection for a payment of $5,000.
Of course, a massive testing program would have nonmonetary costs, both
to those incorrectly identified as being infected (and their potential spouses)
and to those correctly identified who would have to live with the knowledge of
infection and the fear of disease. There is no straightforward way to decide
whether these outweigh the benefits of avoided transmissions. But if one had
to act on behalf of all couples marrying, one might reasonably prefer
mandatory testing either to no testing at all or to the difficulties of a voluntary
system. However, the story does not end here.
Some couples with one infected partner will decide not to marry. Some of the infected
partners in these couples will become sexually abstinent [or] restrict themselves to
"safe" sex, thus avoiding transmission. But other persons [who are] told they are
infected and whose intended spouses break off the engagement will not restrict
themselves to safe sex; some will refuse even to use barrier contraception. For the
unmarried, the total number of sexual partners presumably increases (relative to
entering marriage), and the incentive to prevent the transmission of HIV decreases
(assuming that there is a stronger commitment to a spouse than to one of a series of
lovers). Testing in these cases will lead not only to dollar costs and broken marriages
but also to an increased number of HIV infections.
Whether these additional transmissions would outnumber the intra-marital
transmissions prevented by testing cannot be estimated from any data now on hand.
(It may even depend upon the nature and quality of the counseling services offered in
conjunction with testing, a point which re-emphasizes the importance of counseling as
part of any testing program.) Without better knowledge of the likely behavior of the
tested positives, there is no way to tell whether premarital testing is a good idea or a
bad one. 135
In the absence of any convincing argument that premarital testing would
produce a net reduction in the number of HIV transmissions, the strongest
argument for it would involve the importance of the institution of marriage
generally in social life and specifically in the control of the AIDS epidemic. In
effect, one would have to argue that intramarital transmissions are even more
undesirable than extramarital transmissions.
5. Politics and Obstacles to Change. Moralists have a strong stake in reducing
premarital and extramarital sexual frequency and the number of sexual
partners. Moralists can point to increasing rates of STDs, of teenage
pregnancy, and of one parent families as costs of loosening the connection
between coitus and marriage. Thus, reducing specific risk by distributing
condoms, for example, does not appeal to moralists, and an HIV card might
strike them as a government issued license to practice fornication.
135. Mockler & Kleiman, supra note 131, at 560, 561.
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Libertarians have a string of victories to protect in the areas of sexual
behavior and censorship. AIDS makes it more difficult to insist that sexual
behavior, even among consenting adults, is of only private concern or that
private voluntary action will always adequately control its own side effects. To
the extent that voluntary HIV-free cards would detach sexual behavior from
public concern, they further the libertarian agenda. Furthermore, cards could
stiffen resistance to demands for more drastic forms of isolation of
seropositives.
Following this path would divide libertarians from their allies in the gay-
rights movement, because testing would threaten gay solidarity by dividing
the infected from the uninfected. It would also show the falsehood of the
slogan, "No risk groups, only risky acts." Moreover, it would free most
heterosexuals from the changes in sexual behavior being forced on
homosexual men by the epidemic.
C. Heterosexual Prostitution
Compared to noncommercial heterosexual congress, prostitution poses
special threats and may be amenable to special strategies. Many female
prostitutes are IV drug abusers;' 36 most also face some occupational risk of
HIV infection. Prostitutes expose their partners to possible infection and risk
infection themselves. Calculating the annual number of HIV infections likely
to stem from prostitution is difficult and requires estimates of several
variables which are only poorly known. 13 7 Rough calculations suggest that
between 500 and 5000 men and 250 to 2500 women will become infected with
HIV this year as a direct result of paid male-female sexual contact in the
United States. 3 8 These infections will lead to some unknown number of
secondary infections among prostitutes' and customers' noncommercial
sexual partners and tertiary infections among those partners' other sexual
partners and children.
Although the spread of HIV via prostitution will only slightly increase the
total number of infections, it is well worth controlling. The number of
prostitution related transmissions is a function of the frequency of
prostitution transactions, the riskiness of those transactions to prostitutes and
customers, and the number of transactions involving one uninfected and one
infected party. Public authorities can influence these three factors with
messages aimed at inducing voluntary change and laws designed to force
change.
136. P. GOLDSTEIN, PROSTITUTION AND DRUGS 92-95, 145 (1979) (however, this abuse is
concentrated in streetwalkers); L. Clarke, Reducing the Transmission of AIDS Via Prostitution: A
Policy for the Massachusetts Department of Public Health 5-12 (John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, unpublished Master's Thesis, Apr. 21, 1987).
137. Such variables include the specific risk of different sexual acts and the total annual number
of prostitution transactions in the United States.
138. M. Kleiman & R. Mockler, AIDS and the Criminal Justice System: Developing a Policy
Agenda 14 (Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, Working Paper No. 87-04-01, 1987).
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1. Changing the Frequency of Prostitute Contacts. The total number of
prostitution transactions could be reduced through negative advertising
modeled after the anti-tobacco TV campaign of the late 1960's. The content
of such advertisements should be based upon market research about the
attitudes of prostitutes' customers. A number of themes suggest themselves:
advertisements might emphasize disease risk, or they might suggest that
prostitutes' customers are ridiculous or unmasculine.
On the supply side, voluntary and confidential HIV testing and counseling
for prostitutes might reduce the number of practicing prostitutes. Uninfected
prostitutes might leave the trade if they became convinced that continued
practice put them at risk. This would have two conflicting effects. To the
extent that uninfected prostitutes leave the trade, the supply of prostitutes'
services and the number of prostitutes infected by customers will be reduced.
But an increased quit rate among uninfected prostitutes would tend to
increase the seroprevalence among the remaining active group. Encouraging
infected prostitutes to leave the trade would have only good effects: both a
reduction in the supply of prostitutes' services and a reduction in the
seroprevalence among active prostitutes.
Since prostitution is illegal nearly everywhere in the United States, law
enforcement can also be used to reduce the number of prostitution
transactions. Historically, prostitution enforcement has been aimed at
keeping the trade geographically confined and out of sight.'3 9 AIDS increases
the value of actually shrinking the prostitution industry. Police could enforce
current laws more vigorously by increasing attention and arrests for the less
blatant forms of prostitution such as massage parlors and escort services.
Clarke suggests that these "sex industry" enterprises are likely to account for
many more HIV transmissions than are due to streetwalkers.1 40
Police could also pressure customers by arresting them and publicizing
their names. This policy might noticeably decrease the demand for
prostitutes' services, particularly if the publicity referred to patronizing the
prostitutes as part of the AIDS problem. The effectiveness of such a program
would depend largely on the composition of the customer population,
something about which we currently know very little. If, as Reuter suggests,
much of the market is made up of "young, unmarried and unattractive males,"
such measures would have a much smaller impact than if the market consists
more of married men. 14 1
2. Reducing the Riskiness of Contacts. The specific risk of the average
prostitute-customer contact could also be changed by a campaign of
information and persuasion aimed at changing the mix of sexual acts involved
or by increasing the use of condoms. However, because prostitution remains
139. See H. REYNOLDS, THE ECONOMICS OF PROSTITUTION 40-42 (1986); see also B. COHEN, DEVIANT
STREET NETWORKS 71-72, 117-21 (1980) [hereinafter DEVIANT STREET NETWORKS].
140. L. Clarke, supra note 136, at 9-10.
141. Interview with Peter Reuter, Economist, Rand Corporation (Aug. 1987).
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illegal, any public agency which sponsored such publicity would be in the
uncomfortable position of counseling citizens on how to break the law safely.
Messages could be aimed at both customers and prostitutes. Those
prostitutes who know that they are uninfected have an incentive to practice
safe sex; their interests coincide with everyone else's. Clarke found in
interviews that many Boston prostitutes were aware of AIDS and wished to
avoid it but were often coerced physically or financially by customers or pimps
into risky acts. 142 Many prostitutes felt their livelihood depended on risky
acts.
14 3
It also would be desirable for anti-prostitution law enforcement efforts to
distinguish risky acts from safe acts, but doing so would require police to go
much further toward completing transactions than is now permitted in this
country. 144 In addition to its expense in police time, such practices would
give entirely new and unsavory meaning to the phrase "undercover activity."
3. Reducing Seropositive/Seronegative Contacts. A customer's chances of
encountering an infected prostitute depend on the (frequency-weighted)
seroprevalence among active prostitutes. Absent any sort of identification
method, this in turn depends on: (1) the proportion of prostitutes who are
intravenous drug users and who become infected (before or after becoming
prostitutes) by needle sharing; (2) the proportion infected by customers or
noncommercial sexual partners; and (3) the rate at which infected prostitutes
leave the trade.
One way to reduce the number of active prostitutes infected through
needle sharing is to crack down on retail heroin sales. 145 A second is to offer
drug treatment programs to reduce the economic pressure that makes it
difficult for heroin using prostitutes to leave the trade, although prostitution
may remain the most economically attractive calling for many heroin using
prostitutes even once their drug habits are under control.
Prostitutes who are currently infected and know it face a different set of
choices than do uninfected prostitutes. It is not clear that the interests of
infected prostitutes run with the public interest. Infected prostitutes need no
longer fear HIV infection. However, they might quit the trade if they were
convinced that exposure to semen and to sexually transmitted pathogens
increased their probability of becoming ill with AIDS or ARC, 146 or if they felt
some responsibility not to transmit the virus. The private benefits of leaving
the trade or adopting more cautious practices may not outweigh the private
costs. A testing and counseling program which inadvertently encouraged
uninfected prostitutes to quit and infected prostitutes to continue practicing
142. L. Clarke, supra note 136, at 9, 11.
143. Id. at 9.
144. Recent news reports indicate this is now occurring in Europe. Shearer, The Condom Cops,
PARADE MAGAZINE, Aug. 2, 1987, at 10.
145. See infra at (MS 75).
146. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 57 (suggests that pregnancy might increase this probability).
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would increase the seroprevalence among practicing prositutes, putting
customers at a greater risk than before.
Given the danger which infected prostitutes pose to their customers, an
argument can be made for social programs to induce prostitutes to stop
practicing. However, infected women could enter the trade to obtain
eligibility to participate in the programs. If this occurred, the financial costs
of the programs would increase with the increased volume of participants and
the benefit in terms of AIDS control would be reduced or even reversed, since
the new entrants would presumably practice for some time before being
eligible for enrollment. The greater the proportion of female HIV carriers
who are already prostitutes, the less important this perverse incentive would
be.
Mandatory testing is another approach. This could be done either in the
current environment of illegal prostitution or as part of the regulation of a
legalized prostitution industry. If prostitution were legal, frequent screening
and license revocation for seropositives could keep the infection rate among
prostitutes to a fraction of 1 percent. 147 Customers would be on notice that
contact with unlicensed prostitutes was particularly risky. Such a scheme
would be effective only if regulation were well-enforced and focused primarily
on disease, with prostitutes losing their licenses only for testing positive for
HIV or other STD's. If regulation were poorly enforced, licensed prostitutes
could be carriers. If licenses were revoked for reasons other than HIV
infection, then customers would not presume that unlicensed prostitutes were
infected and an illicit market could develop alongside the licit one as is the
case in Germany.
As long as prostitution remains illegal, screening must be infrequent and
sporadic. Still, prostitutes, particularly the drug dependent prostitutes who
are most likely to be infected, are arrested rather frequently. 48 If persons
convicted of prostitution or narcotics possession were routinely tested for the
virus, a large proportion of infected street prostitutes would be identified
within one year. 149 Practicing prostitution after testing positive could subject
the offender to criminal sanctions or to isolation ordered by the public health
authorities.
It is difficult to predict risk compensating behavior with respect to
legalization or testing. To the extent that prostitutes' potential customers are
deterred by the threat of AIDS, any reduction in the perceived seroprevalence
among prostitutes could increase demand for their services or decrease
147. None of the 34 Nevada prostitutes tested by the Centers for Disease Control were HIV-
positive. See Centers for Disease Control, Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Female Prostitutes, 36
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 157, 158 (1987) [hereinafter Antibody to HIV].
148. Cf P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 89 (drug dependent prostitutes face a high probability of
being arrested).
149. The seroprevalence among prostitutes would keep the relative frequency of false positives
low, even with current testing technology.
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condom use by customers.150 If demand were highly sensitive to perceived
risk, or if perceived risk fell faster than actual risk, a program to screen out
seropositive prostitutes could have perverse effects. Protecting customers
from infected prostitutes is much easier than protecting prostitutes from
infected customers; hiring a prostitute is presumably more spontaneous and
irregular than working as a prostitute, and the creation of time consuming on-
the-spot testing requirements might create demand for an unregulated
parallel market. In a legal market without regulation of risky acts, customers
might refuse to use condoms or practice safe sex, thus placing prostitutes at
greater risk of infection.
The widespread use of a serum status identification scheme would simplify
the control of prostitution related HIV transmission. Regardless of
prostitution's legal status, customers could protect themselves from infected
prostitutes, and prostitutes could protect themselves from infected customers.
Market pressure could drive uninfected prostitutes to acquire the
identification and eventually force infected prostitutes out of business. An
interest in self-protection would encourage uninfected prostitutes to require
identification of customers, and uninfected customers would have incentive to
comply.
4. A Policy of Paralysis. In the absence of an identification system, it seems
plausible that either legalization (with screening) or a vigorous enforcement
crackdown (with screening) would reduce transmissions when compared with
the current regime of weakly enforced prohibition without testing plus some
education and counseling. Yet neither legalization nor vigorous enforcement
has yet been even a serious topic of public debate. Why not?
Consider first the crackdown. Police do not like arresting hookers; police
like to think they have better things to do. Prosecutors and judges do not like
handling the cases, which are routinely pled out and draw small fines, further
discouraging the police.' 5 ' Even those who think that prostitution is evil,
from a moralist or feminist perspective, find it hard to work up much
indignation against prostitutes, and this makes a program of punishing them
and depriving them of their livelihood unattractive, particularly when a
shortage of jail and prison cells means that imprisoning prostitutes would
require freeing other wrongdoers.152 Additionally, "johns" command little
sympathy; there may be some sense that they are getting just what they asked
for if they happen to acquire HIV. More vigorous enforcement against
customers and pimps is the one part of the crackdown prescription likely to
150. There is anecdotal evidence that demand for prostitution has declined in the face of the
AIDS epidemic. Fear of AIDS Chills Sex Industry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 16, 1987, at 25; see also
Leishman, supra note 118.
151. DEVIANT STREET NETWORKS, supra note 139, at 155.
152. Crimes such as prostitution are perfect candidates for non-prison "alternative"
punishments, but in the corrections system the shortage of alternatives exceeds even the shortage of
cells.
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appeal to moralists and feminists alike. Targeting customers and pimps is
also almost certainly the best way to attack juvenile prostitution.
The libertarian view is that prostitution ought to be legal and that
enforcing prohibition is morally wrong, because it punishes an innocuous act,
reinforces the governmental habit of meddling where it does not belong, and
retards private risk-control measures. 53 The investigative techniques
required for prostitution enforcement are intrusive and create great
temptations for perjury, corruption, and police violations of the law.154
Libertarians may oppose compulsory screening of prostitutes on its own
merits; in addition, they may fear such programs could set a precedent for
testing food service workers, immigrants, and other groups for whom
screening would have no epidemic control benefits.
Legalization fits the libertarian view perfectly, and some would concede
the necessity of licensure and screening as adjuncts. However, libertarians do
not rank legalization of prostitution as a high priority target among all the
battles in which the new moralism has them engaged.
Moralists and some feminists argue that legal prostitution would be worse
than illegal prostitution even if its measurable consequences were better,
because the state sanctions would multiply the effectiveness of the bad
messages conveyed by the fact of prostitution. Moreover, the recent U.S.
history of legalized vice, alcohol, and gambling suggests that legalization
leads to vigorous promotion. The economic interests of producers and the
taxing authority are aligned together against tight controls.' 55 As long as
lawyers can persuade courts to seriously consider the proposition that
because tobacco is not strictly forbidden, the first amendment precludes any
attempt to regulate tobacco advertisements, the practical case for legalized
and regulated vice remains in doubt.
D. Male Homosexual Contact
In the United States, HIV spread first and fastest among homosexual men.
Rates and modes of infection and response to the epidemic have been much
different among this group than elsewhere. The initial identification of AIDS
as a "gay plague" greatly influenced the response of other groups to the
disease. 156 The disease has merely reinforced some moralists' abhorrence of
homosexuality and provided an excuse to renew calls for its suppression. 57
Norman Podhoretz characterized the search for an AIDS vaccine as an
153. See H. REYNOLDS, supra note 139, at 190-91. See generally G. GELS, NOT THE LAW'S BUSINESS
173-221, 251-62 (1979).
154. H. BENJAMIN & R. MASTERS, PROSTITUTION AND MORALITY 372-73 (1964) (list of criticisms of
the prohibitionist approach in the United States). See also H. REYNOLDS, supra note 139, at 181-96.
155. R. KING, GAMBLING AND ORGANIZED CRIME 166-69 (1978); Bahmueller, State Policy and the
Ethics of Gambling, il COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING,
GAMBLING IN AMERICA 745, 768-69 (1976).
156. See R. SHILTS, supra note 71, at xxii; see generally D. ALTMAN, AIDS IN THE MIND OF AMERICA
(1986).
157. Cleric Says Existence of AIDS Shows God Unhappy with Homosexuality, Associated Press
International Wire Service, Jan. 17, 1986.
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attempt to allow gays "to resume buggering each by the hundreds with
complete medical impunity."' 58 Libertarians and gay-rights groups, acutely
aware of the potential for repression implicit in identification of the disease
with homosexuality, have sometimes seemed to subordinate public health
concerns to civil liberties concerns: "Ultimately, it may be more important to
let people die in the pursuit of their own happiness than to limit personal
freedom by regulating risk."' 59 The strong ideological commitment on both
sides tends to devalue arguments concerned with slowing the spread of
disease among homosexual men and from them to others.
In some areas, seroprevalence among homosexual men who have had
large numbers of sexual partners approaches 50 percent. 160 The high
prevalence indicates a high probability that a sexual partner who is a male
homosexual or bisexual will be infected. The absolute number of infected
male homosexuals is much higher than the number of infected heterosexuals;
homosexual men still account for 85 percent of all cases. 161
Although research on the sexual behavior of homosexuals is as scarce as
that on heterosexuals, it appears that the sexual habits of many homosexual
men also place them at a higher risk than heterosexuals. 62 Risky sexual acts,
such as anal intercourse, seem to be more common among homosexual men
than among heterosexuals, although self-reports indicate major shifts toward
safer sex by homosexual men. 163 Homosexual men also appear to average
more sexual partners over a lifetime than male heterosexuals. 64 The
combination of high prevalence, high specific risks, and many partners has
produced high infection rates.' 65
Another important difference between homosexual men and heterosexuals
is the high degree of community solidarity which homosexual men, at least
openly homosexual men in urban areas, have built. 166 This solidarity has
proven invaluable both in caring for the sick and in spreading safe sexual
practices. The large and politically powerful gay community in San Francisco
is widely given credit for that city's innovative management of the AIDS
158. Podhoretz, AIDS in Plain English, The N.Y. Post, Sept. 4, 1986, at 27.
159. Callen & Berkowitz, We Know Who We Are, in THE NEw YORK NATIVE 29 (1982), quoted in D.
ALTMAN, supra note 156, at 146.
160. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 89.
161. Id.
162. Marmor, EI-Sadr, Zella-Pazner, Lazaro, Stahl & William, Immunologic AbnormalitiesAmong Male
Homosexuals in New York City: Changes in Time, in ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 312, 317-
18 (1984).
163. See Centers for Disease Control, Self-Reported Changes in Sexual Behaviors Among Homosexual and
Bisexual Men from the San Francisco City Clinic Cohort, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 187,
187-89 (1987) [hereinafter Self-Reported Change]; Spread of AIDS Infection in U.S. May be Slowing, Studies
Indicate, Wall Street J., May 18, 1987, at 8, col. 5 (Eastern ed.).
164. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIEs 82 (1978).
165. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 7, 89 (Seropositivity among male homosexuals may range from under
20% for populations including any individual who has participated in homosexual activity to over
50% in areas for men who have had many partners; in some cities, as many as 70% may be infected.).
166. See generally D. ALTMAN, supra note 156, at 81-109.
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health care delivery system. 167 Gay organizations have encouraged the trends
toward fewer partners, condom use, and nonpenetrative "safe sex."
Some men who regularly have sex with other men also have female sexual
partners-some on a casual basis, some because they are married.' 68 These
women are at risk of acquiring HIV, although the vast majority of women
sexually infected with HIV had IV-drug-using, rather than bisexual,
partners. 169 Complicating the situation are factors such as the likelihood that
married men who have homosexual contacts will not be identified members of
the gay community; these men will not have access to the educational
resources of that community and may be more likely to practice unsafe sex
and less likely to form long term mutually faithful homosexual
relationships. 170
The differences between homosexual and heterosexual men in the AIDS
epidemic profile make different strategies necessary with respect to the two
groups for slowing the spread of HIV and protecting the interests of both the
uninfected and the infected. Currently, uninfected homosexual men who
practice unprotected penetrative sex face a much higher risk of infection than
does virtually anyone else except intravenous drug users. To protect
themselves, homosexual men will have to make drastic changes in behavior
with regard to number and selection of partners and the riskiness of their
sexual acts. Recent changes in the sexual behavior of homosexual men in
some cities have been in the direction of reduced risk, but these changes have
occurred discouragingly slowly in areas where current seroprevalence is
relatively low. '71
Among heterosexuals, the institution of marriage has been held out as a
powerful barrier against the transmission of HIV. Insofar as marriage reduces
the overall number of sexual partners and creates very strong incentives for
partners to discover their relative HIV status and act accordingly, it will tend
to reduce the number of transmissions. In the absence of needle sharing,
"Chastity before marriage, fidelity after" is, if mutually observed, a formula
for complete safety with respect to AIDS.
The argument for marriage as an AIDS prevention device would seem to
be equally valid for homosexuals, and with much greater effect in terms of the
number of potential transmissions prevented. The trend towards fewer
167. Hamilton, Volunteers, Home Care and Money: How San Francisco Has Mobilized, BUSINESS WEEK,
Mar. 23, 1987, at 125; see also R. SHILTS, supra note 71, at 394-95, 569-70.
168. Hamilton, supra note 167, at 125; see also A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, supra note 164, at 160-61.
169. See N.A.S., supra note 1, at 90.
170. Id. at 101; 4 New York Bath Houses Still Operate Under City's Program of Inspections, N.Y. Times,
May 3, 1987, § 1, at 58, col. 1 (quoting Raymond M. Jacobs, coordinator of AIDS Prevention at the
Gay Men's Health Crisis).
171. See, e.g., Fleming, Cochi, Steece & Hull, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Low Incidence
Areas, 258J.A.M.A. 785, 787 (1987) ("Unprotected sexual activity may still be the norm for many gay
and bisexual men in New Mexico. A survey of gay men in Albuquerque indicated that 76% were
practicing receptive anal intercourse and only 10% were using condoms more than 10% of the
time.") (citing Jones, Waskin, Gerety, Skipper, Hull & Mertz, Persistence of High-Risk Sexual Activity
Among Homosexual Men in an Area of Low Incidence of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 14 SEXUALLY
TRANSMrIrED DISEASES 79, 80 (1987)).
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partners and a safer mix of sex acts among homosexual men might be
accelerated if gay couples could have their promises of mutual fidelity
solemnized legally and if they then counted as "married" for purposes of
insurance, inheritance, pension rights, credit, and so on. However, the
stampede of support for "gay marriage" bills from those who believe that
(heterosexual) marriage is the best protection against AIDS has yet to
develop.
Even if the frequency and specific risk of sexual contact among
homosexually active men did not change, the total number of HIV
transmissions due to homosexual activity could change if the number of active
male homosexuals increased or decreased. Merely to raise the topic of how
public or private actions might influence that number is to tread on
dangerous ground; the sensitivity of AIDS as a policy issue is due very largely
to its connection with this question. Supporters of gay liberation fear, and
their opponents hope, that AIDS will provide a pretext for rolling back the
progress that has been made toward state and social neutrality on matters of
sexual preference and its expression. The spread of HIV offers the clearest
possible challenge to the doctrine that what "consenting adults" do in bed is
nobody else's business. However, ignoring that challenge will not make it
disappear.
Just as it does not follow that what someone conceives to be morally
offensive is therefore socially dangerous, it does not follow that whatever is
morally neutral is therefore socially benign. Even if trends among
homosexual men toward safer sex and fewer partners went so far that
homosexual risk per act and mean number of partners matched heterosexual
levels, the very high HIV seroprevalence among the currently active male
homosexual population would leave the currently uninfected proportion of
that population at far higher risk than their heterosexual counterparts. Men
who have sex with men will have to practice much safer sex with many fewer
partners to reduce their HIV infection risk to the level of men who have sex
with women.
Thus, the number of men who become homosexually active at some time
in their lives is important from the perspective of AIDS control. But it is far
from clear what, if anything, can be done on a practical level to influence that
number. The extent to which sexual preference and its expression are
voluntary rather than being determined by some combination of genetics and
early environment remains hotly disputed, although, if adolescent and young
adult experimentation is taken into account, it seems hard to believe that
voluntary choice is never involved. Those making such choices ought to be in
possession of the facts. Also, in the service of two worthy objectives-
encouraging heterosexuals to practice safe sex and discouraging the
expression of anti-homosexual bigotry-there has been some tendency to
downplay the special risks of sex among men. 72
172. For example, the author found the following passage in a brochure which he picked up at a
Lutheran Church in Cambridge, Massachusetts:
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Thus, there are substantial roadblocks to achieving the enormous changes
in frequency, specific risk, and rate of partner switching required to give
currently uninfected homosexual men a normal life expectancy. The only
remaining option is to reduce the proportion of male homosexual contacts
that cross the seropositivity line.
A properly designed serum status identification system such as the one
described in part I could be of enormous advantage to homosexual men. By
far the most important question between prospective sexual partners is
whether or not their serum status is the same. By answering that very
question, a "red light/green light" system could drastically reduce the
relevance of population prevalence and number of partners. By giving
infected individuals a community sanctioned way of confidentially identifying
one another, the system could provide them with access to sexual expression.
Such a system would not be perfect, of course. Testing errors will always
occur; the higher population seroprevalence among homosexual men would
lead to a larger proportion of false negatives.17 3 This would mean that the
seroprevalence among those testing negative would be above zero, but it
would still be far below that of the untested population. 74 The problem of
false positives becoming infected through contact with true positives would be
small compared with the current infection rate. A card system would not
bring the risks of male homosexual activity down to those of heterosexual
activity, but it would substantially narrow the gap.
Other potential complications of a card system include an increase in other
sexually transmitted diseases due to risk compensating increases in frequency
and decreases in the practice of safe sex. 175 Infected individuals probably still
would have an interest in safe sex, at least until it is determined what roles re-
infection and exposure (to other pathogens and foreign proteins) play in
disease expression. Given the high seroprevalence among male homosexuals,
the high specific risks of many sexual acts between men, and the improbability
During discussions about AIDS with preteens and teens, the subject of homosexuality may come
up. It is true that so far nearly three out of four people with AIDS in this country have been gay
or bisexual men. But the opposite is true in other parts of the world. Anyone, gay or straight,
can get AIDS if they have intercourse with an infected person. An increasing number of non-
drug-using heterosexuals in the U.S. have been diagnosed with AIDS.
If you want to explain to your child what homosexuality is, you may simply say that just as
men and women may love each other in a special way, so do men sometimes love other men, and
women sometimes love other women. You may tell your children that you are neither
condeming nor encouraging this kind of loving.
To condemn a group of people because of sexual orientation may be to unknowingly
condemn neighbors, friends, or family members.
Talking to Your Family about AIDS, FAMILY RESOURCES BROCHURE #24, DIVISION OF PARISH SERVICES,
LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA 6 (1987) (Information regarding this brochure is available from
Editor of Family Resources, DPS, 2900 Queen Lane, Philadelphia, PA 19129.).
173. Barry, supra note 54, at 263, 266.
174. Among a population with 50% seroprevalence, even a test with sensitivity and specificity
equal to 99.7% would have three false negatives in every group of 1000 true negatives, for a
seroprevalence among negative testees of 0.3%.
175. This would also be affected by the permanency of the behavioral changes already made by
gay men.
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of complete monogamy in any population, it might be necessary to combine a
move toward nonpenetrative sex, condom use, a reduction in the number of
partners, and a card system in order to reduce lifetime personal risks to even
minimally tolerable levels.
Opposition to testing among libertarians and gay-rights groups has
focused on potential discrimination against the infected and on potential
harm to solidarity within the homosexual community. The system discussed
here would leave little room for discrimination, since test results would not be
recorded by name and any sharing of these results would require consent.
Community solidarity would be crucial for this scheme's success. By
providing safety and sexual opportunity to both the infected and the
uninfected, the system could also serve to lessen fear and distrust among
homosexual men. It would have the added benefit of undercutting the
arguments for suppressing homosexuality.
While an identification system could provide great benefit to identified
homosexuals, its usefulness in keeping HIV from spreading to other
populations is less certain. If the system did keep down the seroprevalence
among homosexual men, it would also keep down the risk among their other
partners. However, unless use of the system became widespread among
heterosexuals also, the effects on the partners of bisexual men, including
those who are married and secretly bisexual, could be perverse. It is
conceivable that infected and identified individuals could look outside the
homosexual community for partners at a higher rate than they otherwise
would. With no system in place among heterosexuals, both women and
secretly homosexual men might then face a higher risk of infection.
All these problems are important, but none overwhelms the advantages
such a program could have in preserving lives of gay men. Risk compensation
among the uninfected would be a problem, but the remaining lifetime risks
would be high enough to encourage caution, particularly if it were backed by
continued "safe sex" messages from gay health groups.
Funding should not be an obstacle to a card system. The costs of HIV
infection are large enough to justify public funding of such a program.
Whether funding would be forthcoming is a different question. In its absence,
however, the private interests of homosexual men in their own health and
sexual freedom would probably support a system provided through some
market or quasi-market arrangement, 176 especially in large urban areas.
Health insurers would have strong incentives to subsidize such a program.
Given the number of lives at stake, all of these options seem worth exploring,
but the anti-testing commitment of the gay leadership seems to be an almost
insurmountable barrier.
176. Such a quasi-market arrangement would involve a non-profit organization.
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E. Intravenous Drug Abuse
People who inject themselves with illicit drugs, primarily heroin users,
spread AIDS among themselves by sharing unsterilized needles. 177 Some
drug users then carry the virus into the nonuser population by giving it to
their sexual partners, who carry it further to other sexual partners and to
children. Most AIDS among prostitutes stems directly from their own IV drug
use, and most newborn pediatric AIDS cases stem from one or both parents'
use of IV drugs.'78
1. Reducing Frequency. Both stepped-up enforcement and increased
availability of treatment programs could reduce the frequency of IV drug use.
Increased enforcement, by making heroin either more expensive or harder
to find, should tend to decrease heroin use just as higher cigarette taxes tend
to decrease tobacco use. Street level crackdowns have reduced overall levels
of heroin use in some areas,' 79 and such programs probably have dramatic
effects on the recruitment of new users, which seems to vary sharply with
retail market conditions.' 80
Expanding treatment programs could reduce the incidence of AIDS
among heroin users.' 8 ' Such an expansion could assist those who participate
in treatment programs, regardless of their HIV status. However, the value of
more treatment in reducing the spread of HIV is less certain. Expanded
treatment could lower the overall frequency of heroin use, but it might do so
with perverse consequences for remaining users. 8 2  In areas where
recruitment of new users is high, treatment would be valuable if it could be
targeted at those new users who have yet to become infected. However, that
would require a major change in current treatment patterns: Some
methadone clinics now require a two year history of drug use for admission to
ensure that nonaddicts are not using methadone clinics as sources of drugs. ' 8 3
Thus, "expanding treatment" requires changing the nature of treatment
as well as spending more money. Moreover, because trained treatment
personnel are scarce, rapidly expanding methadone treatment programs
probably would require shifting away from the current "therapeutic"
177. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 6.
178. Antibody to HIV, supra note 147, at 159; N.A.S., supra note 1, at 62.
179. For general comments on street level crackdowns and some selected case studies, see M.
Kleiman, Crackdowns: The Effects of Intensive Enforcement on Retail Heroin Dealing (Program in
Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, Working Paper No. 87-01-11, December 1987).
180. M. MOORE, BUY AND BUST 241-47 (1975); Moore, Policies to Achieve Discrimination on the Effective
Price of Heroin, 63 AM. EcON. REV. 270, 272-73 (1973).
181. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 108-09.
182. See section 3, Changing Contact Patterns, infra (MS 78).
183. See, e.g., F. HOFMANN, A HANDBOOK ON DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 279 (1983) (discussing "the
prototype of most programs, that of Nyswander and Dole") (citing generally Dole, Nyswander &
Warner, Successful Treatment of 750 Criminal Addicts, 206 J.A.M.A. 2708 (1968)); see also J. PLATrr,
HEROIN ADDICTION THEORY RESEARCH & TREATMENT 309 (1986) (discussing the program of
Nyswander and Dole).
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emphasis to simple drug maintenance. 84 Given the possibly catastrophic
consequences of even temporary relapses into heroin use, there would also be
an argument for eliminating current limits on the length of treatment.
Moreover, methadone "leaks" from clinics into street markets, where it is sold
and injected much like heroin. 185 This leakage from staff and clients would
grow with the growth of the programs. Increased leakage would increase the
availability of drugs to new users and thus tend to defeat the frequency
reduction accomplished by the expanded treatment. Convincing potential
recruits not to begin using heroin would be an ideal way to slow the spread of
HIV to new users, but the efficacy of prevention campaigns has yet to be
demonstrated.
2. Reducing Specific Risk. A variety of government actions could reduce the
specific risk in IV drug use. Legalization of heroin-with the drug marketed
or otherwise distributed in pre-filled, single dose disposable syringes-would
almost eliminate the specific risk of HIV infection to users but would also
increase the frequency of use, perhaps dramatically. The combined effect of
legalization and increased consumption on crime, community life, the life
chances of poor children, and public health and morals could be profound,
for good or bad, and are not easily predicted.18 6 Legalization for current
addicts only-heroin maintenance-is similar to expanded methadone
treatment in its promise and perils.
Legalizing needles would have much less clear effects. Users probably
would share less if needles were readily and legally available, but there is also
evidence that in the heroin using culture, needle sharing has social values
independent of its practicality.18 7 Making needles easier to get could lead
some persons who currently smoke, swallow, or snort drugs other than heroin
to begin to use them intravenously, even if it did not dramatically lower the
barriers to heroin use per se. This would increase those persons' risk of
acquiring AIDS and other ill effects of IV drug use.
Information could also serve as a reasonable substitute for new needles.
Users can kill the AIDS virus with relatively simple sterilization procedures
such as immersion in bleach, and informing users of these procedures would
be simple and have few negative side effects. 188 Exchanging new needles for
old ones has limited direct value, because it would not relieve the scarcity of
needles 8 9 and because the relevant characteristic of needles is their being
shared rather than being old. The offer of "clean needles," however, could be
184. For a discussion of therapeutic treatment, see Friedman, DesJarlais & Goldsmith, An
Overview of Current AIDS Prevention Efforts Aimed at Intravenous Drug Users, J. DRUG ISSUES (forthcoming
1989).
185. B. JOHNSON, P. GOLDSTEIN, E. PREBLE, J. SCHMEIDLER, D. LIPTON, B. SPURT & T. MILLER,
TAKING CARE OF BuSINESS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME BY HEROIN ABUSERS 4 (1985).
186. J. KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 111 (1983) ("[Plredictions are
quite uncertain and difficult.").
187. Friedman, DesJarlais & Sotheran, supra note 18, at 385.
188. Id. at 388.
189. This assumes that scarcity is a factor promoting needle sharing.
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an inducement for users to meet with health workers who could distribute
advice, and bleach, as they traded new works for old.
3. Changing Contact Patterns. Under limited circumstances, expanded
treatment also holds some promise for reducing seroprevalence among users,
thus reducing the chance that an uninfected user will encounter an infected
one. To succeed, expanded treatment would have to substantially diminish
the ratio of infected experienced users to recruits. Seasoned users are both
more likely to be infected with HIV and more likely to enter treatment, but if
seroprevalence in an area is already very high, many less experienced users
will also be infected. Thus, the outflow of infected users into treatment
programs might not significantly lower the seroprevalence among remaining
users. However, in areas with relatively low seroprevalence, a program of
expanded treatment for seasoned users might succeed in significantly
lowering the seroprevalence of the remaining needle sharing population. In
some areas far from New York, the prevalence of seropositivity among active
heroin users may be as low as 2 percent.1 90
In addition to generalized street level crackdowns, police could target
"shooting galleries," where users gather to shoot up and often to rent
"works." 1 91 By eliminating a common needle sharing environment, this
targeting would tend to reduce the number of persons with whom any one
person shares needles. In needle sharing as in sex, having few partners is
safer than having many, particularly when seroprevalence is low. Arresting
users for possession of needles should be abandoned because this tactic does
little to counter drug use and provides users with an incentive to congregate
in shooting galleries and share needles to avoid carrying contraband. Though
testing drug using prostitutes might help to protect their customers, it is
difficult to conceive of an effective screening or segregation policy to protect
drug users from each other.
4. Obstacles to Change. Drug policy is like prostitution policy; either
legalization or a crackdown would likely improve on current policy. Weakly
enforced prohibition increases specific risk without adequately reducing
frequency.
From a libertarian viewpoint heroin addicts are victims of a bad policy.
Cracking down on them seems wrong. Many police departments are almost
equally unenthusiastic: street level drug enforcement is unpleasant work. As
for making a special effort to shut down shooting galleries to protect heroin
users from AIDS, the private comment of one New York City police
190. N.A.S., supra note 1, at 107 ("The further the distance from New York City, the lower the
prevalence of seropositivity among IV drug users . . . . A [methadone maintenance treatment]
program in a city approximately 100 miles from downtown New York had a seropositivity rate of 2
percent.").
191. "Works" are the equipment needed for intravenous drug use-a syringe and hypodermic
needle.
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commander is straightforward: "As far as most cops are concerned, the faster
all the junkies die, the better."' 92
To the moralists and some consequentialists, on the other hand,
legalization of heroin is a horrible idea. Their objections would not disappear
even if they were convinced that the current misery and crime associated with
heroin addiction are artifacts of prohibition. They would argue that the drug
is pharmacologically, and independently of its legal status, a threat to the
dignity and autonomy of its users. They would ask an important question: If
we could slightly slow the spread of AIDS, but at the cost of adding to our
several million alcoholics a similar or even larger number of legal heroin
bums, would that be a good trade or bad one? The answer to that question
remains unclear.
F. Prisons
Prisons combine a population likely to contain a high proportion of former
IV drug users with an environment in which homosexual sex is fairly
commonplace and in which IV drug use is not unknown. 193 Each year, state
prisons may be releasing hundreds men who have acquired HIV while in
prison. 194
Sex and drug use in prisons are already illegal, and reducing their
frequency would require strengthening the enforcement of these
prohibitions. Prison officials could increase surveillance of prisoners in
situations where sexual activity or drug use is believed to be likely. In order to
eradicate drug use, officials could also conduct frequent urine tests on
prisoners and severely penalize those found to be using drugs. Many prison
rapes go unreported because of fear of retribution.195 Tougher sanctions and
improved reporting systems might reduce the incidence of forced sexual
contact.
Reducing the specific risk of prison sex and drug use would be very
difficult, although prisoners could benefit as much as anyone else from
programs detailing the risks of certain sexual and other practices and
explaining safer alternatives. The distribution of condoms in prisons would
seem to sanction an illegal activity which prison officials blame for a
substantial percentage of prison violence. 196 Prison sex often serves both as a
192. Confidential interview with unnamed New York City police commander (Sept. 1986).
193. U.S. Department ofJustice, Prisoners and Drugs, U.S. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN,
Mar. 1983, at 1 (30% of the prisoners sampled had used heroin at some time in their lives); P. Nacci
& T. Kane, Sex and Sexual Aggression in Federal Prisons 7 (Bureau of Prison Policy, unpublished
report, 1982) (35-40% of incarcerated males may have had a homosexual experience; 28% of federal
inmates report homosexual experience); see also N.A.S., supra note 1, at 60 (citing U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Prisoners and Drugs, supra).
194. M. Kleiman & P. Mockler, supra note 138, at 16 (Kleiman and Mockler estimate 1800 per
year.).
195. W. WOODEN &J. PARKER, MEN BEHIND BARS 106-07 (1982).
196. Cf P. Nacci & T. Kane, supra note 193, at 16 (Correctional officers believe that "consensual
homosexuality in prison frequently leads to violence.").
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sexual outlet and as a form of aggression. 19 7 Rape is at one pole of a
continuum of sex/power relationships among prisoners. Because it is unlikely
that rapists would use condoms, rape victims would remain vulnerable to
disease. Distributing clean needles in prison would have all the problems of
the same policy on the outside and some additional complications such as the
potential uses of needles as weapons and an increased prison trade in drugs.
Reducing contacts between infected and uninfected prisoners would be
rather simple in theory: Test all prisoners and segregate those who test
positive. Such a policy would be vulnerable to lags in the development of
antibodies, thus leaving some infected prisoners with the general population,
and to false test results: A seronegative prisoner who tested positive would be
placed in a highly dangerous environment, while seropositive prisoners left
with the general population would constitute a risk to any partners in sex or
needle sharing. Running a screening and segregation program would also
pose serious problems of administration. In particular, staffing units which
housed infected prisoners would be difficult.
Administrators would have to ensure that infected prisoners had facilities
equal to those of the general prison population or risk violating the prisoners'
rights of equal protection.19 8 Because repeated exposure to the virus may
hasten the onset of disease in infected persons, units for segregated prisoners
would also require especially diligent enforcement of anti-rape laws. Unless
stringent anti-discrimination policies were in place, or unless prison officials
could maintain the confidentiality of those released from HIV-positive units,
infected prisoners who had been segregated could also face serious problems
upon release. 199
Uninfected prisoners have much to gain from screening and segregation
programs, because these programs would substantially reduce their risk of
contracting HIV. Indeed, the absence of such programs in prisons where
rape is relatively common arguably subjects uninfected prisoners to cruel and
unusual punishment.200  Screening and segregation would have some
advantages over tougher enforcement of existing regulations; to be fully
197. Id. at 13.
198. See also Vaid, Balanced Response Needed to AIDS in Prison, NAT'L PRISON PROJ. J., Spring 1986, at
1, 5. Cf Vaid, NPP Gathers the Facts on AIDS in Prisons, NAT'L PRISON PROJ. J., Winter 1985, at 1, 3 (a
claim of such violation would require a showing that plaintiffs were denied adequate food, clothing,
shelter, sanitation, medical care, and safety).
199. Cf Vaid, Balanced Response, supra note 198, at 1, 4 (There is little confidentiality of medical
information in most prisons, and seropositive prisoners might be assaulted in the general
population.).
200. T. HAMMET[, AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: ISSUES AND OPrIONS 15 (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter ISSUES AND OPTIONS] (for the National Institute of Justice: Issues and Practices) (A
Federal Bureau of Prisons Report indicates that between 9% and 20% of prison inmates . . . are
targets for aggressive sex acts during their incarceration (citing P. Nacci & T. Kane, supra note 193, at
I I.)).
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effective, such enforcement might reqtqire extreme invasions of privacy such
as continual electronic surveillance. 201
Yet there are few advocates for prison screening and segregation. Only a
few states-and none of those with the highest estimated prisoner
seroprevalence-even go so far as to test inmates, and the incidence of
segregation has decreased in the last year. 20 2 Most states do not even allow
prisoners to request testing.203 Some moralists support such programs but
generally have things other than the welfare of convicts to worry about.
Libertarians are afraid of mandatory testing in any guise and generally
support extensive education as the cure for the problem of transmission in
prisons. 20 4  Such educational programs have received fairly glowing
reviews, 20 5 but no one has yet done a serious study of whether or not they are
effective in the prison setting.
Prison administrators consider liability suits on one side and
administrative nightmares on the other, and they do not know what to do.
Prison systems currently face lawsuits which both demand and oppose
screening and segregation. 20 6 The jury is still out on which policy is the safest
in terms of liability.
With prisons, as with drug enforcement, prostitution, and day-to-day
sexual encounters, little changes. The ongoing philosophical struggle
between defenders of morality and defenders of liberty overpowers the
defense of the public health.
IV
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed all of this information, it .remains unclear, even from a
purely consequentialist point of view, what will and will not help control the
spread of HIV. Ignorance about a number of important factors-including
the probability that an infected individual will progress to AIDS or ARC, the
contact specific risks of different acts with respect to HIV transmission, the
patterns of who does what with whom, and the dynamics of retransmission
and how they vary across populations-makes decisionmaking harder.
201. But see generally J. DIIULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL
MANAGEMENT (1987) (argument that better prison management focused on control can reduce prison
rape and other misconduct).
202. T. HAMMETr, 1986 UPDATE: AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 10 (1987) [hereinafter
UPDATE]. (Between November 1985 and October 1986, the percentage of city and county jail
systems that segregated all three inmate categories-AIDS cases, ARC cases, and seropositives-
decreased from 41% to 27%; the percentage of state and federal systems that segregate none of these
categories increased from 4% to 12%. The sample sizes for this survey were n=51 for state and
federal system, and n=33 for city and county systems; the October 1986 survey updated the status of
the systems sampled in the November 1985 (original) survey.).
203. T. HAMMETr, ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 200, at 39 (18% of state/federal systems and
33% of city/county systems provide testing to any inmate upon request).
204. E.g., Vaid, NPP supra note 198, at 2; Bayer, supra note 52, at 1772.
205. See T. HAMMETr, ISSUES AND OPTIONS, supra note 200, at 30.
206. Id. at xxiv-xxv.
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Technological barriers-to the treatment of AIDS and its prevention by
vaccine, to eliminating false positive and false negative test results, to the
design of legal systems to protect the rights of identified seropositives-
complicate matters. However, analysis demonstrates that some interventions
are unambiguously helpful, while others, apparently innocuous at worst,
could do more harm than good.
A simple model of the factors of risk points to three areas for intervention
and behavioral change: frequency of risk contact, contact specific risks, and
the proportion of risky acts involving a mix of seropositive and seronegative
individuals. Any intervention faces two potentially serious complications-
risk compensation and other unintended side effects.
Risk factors and the dynamics of retransmission vary across populations.
While ignorance of the details of these differences hampers analysis to some
degree, some conclusions remain robust. The first and most obvious of these
is that different populations will have to take different actions to protect
themselves from HIV, and that policy makers must account for these
differences in designing interventions. A policy debate dominated, as the
current national debate is, by the problems of high risk areas and groups may
miss major opportunities. Spokane might benefit from approaches no longer
relevant to New York.
It is also apparent that keeping HIV from spreading to new populations
should have high priority, because of the large number of retransmissions
likely to stem from new infections in populations with relatively low current
seroprevalence. At the same time, analysis shows that members of "risk
groups" face grave risks of infection over their lifetimes. Such risks may
necessitate both massive behavioral changes and such extraordinary measures
as the creation of serum status identification systems to protect the uninfected
and to provide sexual opportunity to the infected. High risks may also justify
extraordinary efforts to discourage people from becoming members of risk
groups.
Ideally, analysis would also help in allocating limited resources within and
across populations. To a certain extent it does this now by pointing to "fire-
breaks" such as existing barriers between populations and by demonstrating
the risk factors which are possible to change within groups. However, public
agencies do not work from a single pool of resources. This both reduces the
efficiency with which resources can be targeted and reduces the number of
hard choices (for example, between reducing transmissions among IV drug
users and reducing them among transfusion recipients) which must be faced,
since avenues and agencies exist to confront many of the different "margins"
of the epidemic simultaneously.
Policy analysis, then, has something to say about the AIDS epidemic and
how to limit it. It can allow at least rough calculations of efficacy and rough
comparisons of cost effectiveness across the choices to be made given current
knowledge and technique. By illuminating crucial areas of ignorance, it can
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guide future research efforts. Finally, analysis shows that people who say that
the AIDS problem will be solved by "education" are either using the term
extremely broadly or are badly oversimplifying the AIDS problem.
